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Modelling security risk in critical utilities: the system at risk as a three player game and agent society

Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/ProceedingsConference contribution

Published
Publication date9/10/2016
Host publicationProceedings of SMC 2016
PublisherIEEE
Number of pages6
<mark>Original language</mark>English
Event2016 IEEE SMC -

Conference

Conference2016 IEEE SMC
Period9/10/16 → …

Conference

Conference2016 IEEE SMC
Period9/10/16 → …

Abstract

It becomes essential when reasoning about the security risks to critical utilities such electrical power and water distribution to recognize that the interests of producers and consumers do not fully coincide. They may have incentives to behave strategically towards each other, as well as toward some third party adversary. We therefore argue for the need to extend the prior literature, which has concentrated on the strategic, adaptive game between adversary and defender, towards 3-player games. But it becomes hard to justify modelling a population of consumers as a single, decision making actor. So we also show how we can model consumers as a group of mutually-influencing, yet not centrally co-ordinated, heterogeneous agents. And we suggest how this representation can be integrated into a game-theoretic framework. This requires a framework in which payoffs are known by the players only stochastically. We present some basic models and demonstrate the nature of the modelling commitments that need to be made in order to reason about utilities’ security risk.