Home > Research > Publications & Outputs > Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auc...

Research

Electronic data

  • FinalAccepted_EconLett_Mar16

    Rights statement: This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Economics Letters. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Economics Letters, 142, 2016 DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.03.003

    Accepted author manuscript, 263 KB, PDF document

    Available under license: CC BY-NC-ND: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License

Links

Text available via DOI:

Keywords

View graph of relations

Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Published
<mark>Journal publication date</mark>05/2016
<mark>Journal</mark>Economics Letters
Volume142
Number of pages4
Pages (from-to)74-77
Publication StatusPublished
Early online date11/03/16
<mark>Original language</mark>English

Abstract

We consider a symmetric two-player common-value setting where each player gets a private signal about the object value. We show that for some parameter values the equilibrium revenue can be higher in a Tullock contest than in the standard auctions.

Bibliographic note

This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Economics Letters. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Economics Letters, 142, 2016 DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.03.003