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    Rights statement: This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of International Economics. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of International Economics, 105, 2017 DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2016.12.001

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Suspiciously timed trade disputes

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal article

Published
  • Paola Conconi
  • David R. DeRemer
  • Georg Kirchsteiger
  • Lorenzo Trimarchi
  • Maurizio Zanardi
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<mark>Journal publication date</mark>03/2017
<mark>Journal</mark>Journal of International Economics
Volume105
Number of pages20
Pages (from-to)57-76
Publication statusPublished
Early online date18/12/16
Original languageEnglish

Abstract

This paper shows that electoral incentives crucially affect the initiation of trade disputes. Focusing on WTO disputes filed by the United States during the 1995-2014 period, we find that U.S. presidents are more likely to initiate a dispute in the year preceding their re-election. Moreover, U.S. trade disputes are more likely to involve industries that are important in swing states. To explain these regularities, we develop a theoretical model in which re-election motives can lead an incumbent politician to file trade disputes to appeal to voters motivated by reciprocity.

Bibliographic note

This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Journal of International Economics. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Journal of International Economics, 105, 2017 DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2016.12.001