Home > Research > Publications & Outputs > Why we do not perceive aesthetic properties
View graph of relations

Why we do not perceive aesthetic properties

Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/ProceedingsChapter

Published
Publication date2014
Host publicationMind, values and metaphysics: philosophical papers dedicated to Kevin Mulligan
EditorsAnne Reboul
PublisherSpringer
Pages105-117
Number of pages13
Volume2
ISBN (Electronic)9783319051468
ISBN (Print)9783319051451
<mark>Original language</mark>English

Abstract

This chapter examines whether there are genuine cases of aesthetic perception, and hence whether aesthetic judgements depend on the perception of aesthetic properties. My response will be negative. Specifically, I will argue that although our access to aesthetic ‘properties’ does appear to resemble perception in certain respects, it differs in two key ways from cases of ordinary everyday perception: (a) in its opacity (i.e. its lacking transparency) and (b) in its partly nonattributive phenomenology.