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Why we do not perceive aesthetic properties

Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSNChapter

Publication date2014
Host publicationMind, values and metaphysics: philosophical papers dedicated to Kevin Mulligan
EditorsAnne Reboul
Number of pages13
ISBN (Electronic)9783319051468
ISBN (Print)9783319051451
Original languageEnglish


This chapter examines whether there are genuine cases of aesthetic perception, and hence whether aesthetic judgements depend on the perception of aesthetic properties. My response will be negative. Specifically, I will argue that although our access to aesthetic ‘properties’ does appear to resemble perception in certain respects, it differs in two key ways from cases of ordinary everyday perception: (a) in its opacity (i.e. its lacking transparency) and (b) in its partly nonattributive phenomenology.