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  • 2017_7_multe_submitted

    Rights statement: This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Economics Letters. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Economics Letters, 164, 2018 DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.01.011

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    Embargo ends: 31/07/19

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A fine collection: The political budget cycle of traffic enforcement

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal article

Published
<mark>Journal publication date</mark>03/2018
<mark>Journal</mark>Economics Letters
Volume164
Number of pages4
Pages (from-to)117-120
StatePublished
Early online date31/01/18
Original languageEnglish

Abstract

We find evidence that before elections Italian mayors issue fewer traffic tickets and collect a lower proportion of issued fines. This is first-hand evidence that tax collection – other than tax setting – can be strategically used to affect electoral results.

Bibliographic note

This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Economics Letters. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Economics Letters, 164, 2018 DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.01.011