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    Rights statement: This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Economics Letters. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Economics Letters, 164, 2018 DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.01.011

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A fine collection: The political budget cycle of traffic enforcement

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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A fine collection: The political budget cycle of traffic enforcement. / Bracco, Emanuele.
In: Economics Letters, Vol. 164, 03.2018, p. 117-120.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Bracco, E 2018, 'A fine collection: The political budget cycle of traffic enforcement', Economics Letters, vol. 164, pp. 117-120. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.01.011

APA

Bracco, E. (2018). A fine collection: The political budget cycle of traffic enforcement. Economics Letters, 164, 117-120. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.01.011

Vancouver

Bracco E. A fine collection: The political budget cycle of traffic enforcement. Economics Letters. 2018 Mar;164:117-120. Epub 2018 Jan 31. doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.01.011

Author

Bracco, Emanuele. / A fine collection : The political budget cycle of traffic enforcement. In: Economics Letters. 2018 ; Vol. 164. pp. 117-120.

Bibtex

@article{ca9ed830325f4e9c94ca3035b2270d49,
title = "A fine collection: The political budget cycle of traffic enforcement",
abstract = "We find evidence that before elections Italian mayors issue fewer traffic tickets and collect a lower proportion of issued fines. This is first-hand evidence that tax collection – other than tax setting – can be strategically used to affect electoral results.",
keywords = "Political budget cycle, Parking tickets, Tax collection",
author = "Emanuele Bracco",
note = "This is the author{\textquoteright}s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Economics Letters. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Economics Letters, 164, 2018 DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.01.011",
year = "2018",
month = mar,
doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2018.01.011",
language = "English",
volume = "164",
pages = "117--120",
journal = "Economics Letters",
issn = "0165-1765",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - A fine collection

T2 - The political budget cycle of traffic enforcement

AU - Bracco, Emanuele

N1 - This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Economics Letters. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Economics Letters, 164, 2018 DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.01.011

PY - 2018/3

Y1 - 2018/3

N2 - We find evidence that before elections Italian mayors issue fewer traffic tickets and collect a lower proportion of issued fines. This is first-hand evidence that tax collection – other than tax setting – can be strategically used to affect electoral results.

AB - We find evidence that before elections Italian mayors issue fewer traffic tickets and collect a lower proportion of issued fines. This is first-hand evidence that tax collection – other than tax setting – can be strategically used to affect electoral results.

KW - Political budget cycle

KW - Parking tickets

KW - Tax collection

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.01.011

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.01.011

M3 - Journal article

VL - 164

SP - 117

EP - 120

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

SN - 0165-1765

ER -