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  • Anglo-Nigerian Agreement Agreement JICH revised final

    Rights statement: This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History on 03/08/2016, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/03086534.2016.1210255

    Accepted author manuscript, 524 KB, PDF document

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A Post-Imperial Cold War Paradox: The Anglo-Nigerian Defence Agreement 1958-1962

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal article

Published
<mark>Journal publication date</mark>11/2016
<mark>Journal</mark>Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History
Issue number6
Volume44
Number of pages25
Pages (from-to)976-1000
Publication StatusPublished
Early online date3/08/16
<mark>Original language</mark>English

Abstract

As the recent and current French military interventions in West Africa have illustrated, France succeeded in establishing long-lasting security relationships with its former colonies during the transfer of power. In Britain’s case, by contrast, decolonisation was largely followed by military withdrawal. This was not, however, for lack of trying. The episode of the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Agreement clearly illustrates that Britain, driven by its global cold war military strategy, wanted to secure its long-term interests in sub-Saharan Africa. The agreement was first welcomed by the Nigerian elite, which was not only anglophile and anti-communist, but also wanted British military assistance for the build-up of its armed forces. Yet, in Nigeria, the defence pact was faced with mounting opposition, and decried as a neo-colonial scheme. Whereas this first allowed the Nigerian leaders to extract strategic, material and financial concessions from Britain, it eventually led to the abrogation of the agreement. Paradoxically, Britain’s cold war grand strategy created not only the need for the agreement, but also to abrogate it. In the increasingly global East-West struggle, the agreement was strategically desirable, but politically counterproductive.

Bibliographic note

This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History on 03/08/2016, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/03086534.2016.1210255