Rights statement: This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History on 03/08/2016, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/03086534.2016.1210255
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Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - A Post-Imperial Cold War Paradox
T2 - The Anglo-Nigerian Defence Agreement 1958-1962
AU - Wyss, Marco
N1 - This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History on 03/08/2016, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/03086534.2016.1210255
PY - 2016/11
Y1 - 2016/11
N2 - As the recent and current French military interventions in West Africa have illustrated, France succeeded in establishing long-lasting security relationships with its former colonies during the transfer of power. In Britain’s case, by contrast, decolonisation was largely followed by military withdrawal. This was not, however, for lack of trying. The episode of the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Agreement clearly illustrates that Britain, driven by its global cold war military strategy, wanted to secure its long-term interests in sub-Saharan Africa. The agreement was first welcomed by the Nigerian elite, which was not only anglophile and anti-communist, but also wanted British military assistance for the build-up of its armed forces. Yet, in Nigeria, the defence pact was faced with mounting opposition, and decried as a neo-colonial scheme. Whereas this first allowed the Nigerian leaders to extract strategic, material and financial concessions from Britain, it eventually led to the abrogation of the agreement. Paradoxically, Britain’s cold war grand strategy created not only the need for the agreement, but also to abrogate it. In the increasingly global East-West struggle, the agreement was strategically desirable, but politically counterproductive.
AB - As the recent and current French military interventions in West Africa have illustrated, France succeeded in establishing long-lasting security relationships with its former colonies during the transfer of power. In Britain’s case, by contrast, decolonisation was largely followed by military withdrawal. This was not, however, for lack of trying. The episode of the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Agreement clearly illustrates that Britain, driven by its global cold war military strategy, wanted to secure its long-term interests in sub-Saharan Africa. The agreement was first welcomed by the Nigerian elite, which was not only anglophile and anti-communist, but also wanted British military assistance for the build-up of its armed forces. Yet, in Nigeria, the defence pact was faced with mounting opposition, and decried as a neo-colonial scheme. Whereas this first allowed the Nigerian leaders to extract strategic, material and financial concessions from Britain, it eventually led to the abrogation of the agreement. Paradoxically, Britain’s cold war grand strategy created not only the need for the agreement, but also to abrogate it. In the increasingly global East-West struggle, the agreement was strategically desirable, but politically counterproductive.
KW - Britain
KW - Nigeria
KW - Anglo-Nigerian relations
KW - West Africa
KW - Cold War
KW - defence
KW - transfer of power
KW - post-imperial
KW - neo-colonialism
KW - non-alignment
U2 - 10.1080/03086534.2016.1210255
DO - 10.1080/03086534.2016.1210255
M3 - Journal article
VL - 44
SP - 976
EP - 1000
JO - Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History
JF - Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History
SN - 0308-6534
IS - 6
ER -