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A reappraisal of Kendell and Jablensky's account of validity

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A reappraisal of Kendell and Jablensky's account of validity. / Fellowes, Sam.
In: Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice, Vol. 22, No. 4, 08.2016, p. 522-529.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Fellowes, S 2016, 'A reappraisal of Kendell and Jablensky's account of validity', Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 522-529. https://doi.org/10.1111/jep.12519

APA

Fellowes, S. (2016). A reappraisal of Kendell and Jablensky's account of validity. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice, 22(4), 522-529. https://doi.org/10.1111/jep.12519

Vancouver

Fellowes S. A reappraisal of Kendell and Jablensky's account of validity. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice. 2016 Aug;22(4):522-529. Epub 2016 May 1. doi: 10.1111/jep.12519

Author

Fellowes, Sam. / A reappraisal of Kendell and Jablensky's account of validity. In: Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice. 2016 ; Vol. 22, No. 4. pp. 522-529.

Bibtex

@article{4f90d3fa0a124d2c9888013929a13d41,
title = "A reappraisal of Kendell and Jablensky's account of validity",
abstract = "Kendell and Jablensky argue that validity in psychiatry requires either unique biological characteristics or a zone of rarity, where few symptoms of one syndrome are present in another syndrome. Meeting either of these criteria allows the inference that the syndrome is caused by a specific biological mechanism not present in other syndromes. Failing to meet either of these criteria means the syndrome has been arbitrarily grouped and is invalid. Kendell and Jablensky's account of validity is too restrictive. Scientific phenomena are generally produced by a multiplicity of unstable overlapping causes, the causes for one phenomenon typically also present in other phenomena. Despite this, scientific phenomena are not automatically arbitrary. Science employs idealistic models that can successfully describe phenomena produced by overlapping causes and can gain approximately true knowledge of that phenomenon. The specific biological mechanisms that Kendell and Jablensky see as delivering validity are only specific in an idealized sense. Also, approximate truth means Kendell and Jablensky are mistaken to see validity as invariant and independent of context. An alternative approach to inferring causes is the common cause and unifications. Scientists often see otherwise unrelated phenomena regularly co-occur, and this legitimizes inferring common causes responsible for the phenomena. Applied to psychiatry, I show how syndromes that cover many different unrelated phenomena allow an inference to common causes, and this delivers validity. Zones of rarity can actually decrease validity. Idealized models often produce more information about causes by covering more phenomena, whereas zones of rarity often reduce the number of symptoms covered by a syndrome. Ignoring zones of rarity in favour of syndromes that cover many symptoms can sometimes increase validity. This can also occur when validating syndromes through corroborations with other factors. Increasing corroborations may require reducing the number of symptoms, potentially reducing validity.",
keywords = "causation, common cause, Kendell and Jablensky, philosophy, validity, zone of rarity",
author = "Sam Fellowes",
year = "2016",
month = aug,
doi = "10.1111/jep.12519",
language = "English",
volume = "22",
pages = "522--529",
journal = "Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice",
issn = "1356-1294",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - A reappraisal of Kendell and Jablensky's account of validity

AU - Fellowes, Sam

PY - 2016/8

Y1 - 2016/8

N2 - Kendell and Jablensky argue that validity in psychiatry requires either unique biological characteristics or a zone of rarity, where few symptoms of one syndrome are present in another syndrome. Meeting either of these criteria allows the inference that the syndrome is caused by a specific biological mechanism not present in other syndromes. Failing to meet either of these criteria means the syndrome has been arbitrarily grouped and is invalid. Kendell and Jablensky's account of validity is too restrictive. Scientific phenomena are generally produced by a multiplicity of unstable overlapping causes, the causes for one phenomenon typically also present in other phenomena. Despite this, scientific phenomena are not automatically arbitrary. Science employs idealistic models that can successfully describe phenomena produced by overlapping causes and can gain approximately true knowledge of that phenomenon. The specific biological mechanisms that Kendell and Jablensky see as delivering validity are only specific in an idealized sense. Also, approximate truth means Kendell and Jablensky are mistaken to see validity as invariant and independent of context. An alternative approach to inferring causes is the common cause and unifications. Scientists often see otherwise unrelated phenomena regularly co-occur, and this legitimizes inferring common causes responsible for the phenomena. Applied to psychiatry, I show how syndromes that cover many different unrelated phenomena allow an inference to common causes, and this delivers validity. Zones of rarity can actually decrease validity. Idealized models often produce more information about causes by covering more phenomena, whereas zones of rarity often reduce the number of symptoms covered by a syndrome. Ignoring zones of rarity in favour of syndromes that cover many symptoms can sometimes increase validity. This can also occur when validating syndromes through corroborations with other factors. Increasing corroborations may require reducing the number of symptoms, potentially reducing validity.

AB - Kendell and Jablensky argue that validity in psychiatry requires either unique biological characteristics or a zone of rarity, where few symptoms of one syndrome are present in another syndrome. Meeting either of these criteria allows the inference that the syndrome is caused by a specific biological mechanism not present in other syndromes. Failing to meet either of these criteria means the syndrome has been arbitrarily grouped and is invalid. Kendell and Jablensky's account of validity is too restrictive. Scientific phenomena are generally produced by a multiplicity of unstable overlapping causes, the causes for one phenomenon typically also present in other phenomena. Despite this, scientific phenomena are not automatically arbitrary. Science employs idealistic models that can successfully describe phenomena produced by overlapping causes and can gain approximately true knowledge of that phenomenon. The specific biological mechanisms that Kendell and Jablensky see as delivering validity are only specific in an idealized sense. Also, approximate truth means Kendell and Jablensky are mistaken to see validity as invariant and independent of context. An alternative approach to inferring causes is the common cause and unifications. Scientists often see otherwise unrelated phenomena regularly co-occur, and this legitimizes inferring common causes responsible for the phenomena. Applied to psychiatry, I show how syndromes that cover many different unrelated phenomena allow an inference to common causes, and this delivers validity. Zones of rarity can actually decrease validity. Idealized models often produce more information about causes by covering more phenomena, whereas zones of rarity often reduce the number of symptoms covered by a syndrome. Ignoring zones of rarity in favour of syndromes that cover many symptoms can sometimes increase validity. This can also occur when validating syndromes through corroborations with other factors. Increasing corroborations may require reducing the number of symptoms, potentially reducing validity.

KW - causation

KW - common cause

KW - Kendell and Jablensky

KW - philosophy

KW - validity

KW - zone of rarity

U2 - 10.1111/jep.12519

DO - 10.1111/jep.12519

M3 - Journal article

VL - 22

SP - 522

EP - 529

JO - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice

JF - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice

SN - 1356-1294

IS - 4

ER -