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  • eer-d-18-01060_manuscript

    Rights statement: This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in European Economic Review. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in European Economic Review, 119, 2019 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.07.005

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    Embargo ends: 27/07/21

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(Almost) efficient information transmission in elections

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal article

Published
<mark>Journal publication date</mark>1/10/2019
<mark>Journal</mark>European Economic Review
Volume119
Number of pages19
Pages (from-to)147-165
Publication statusPublished
Original languageEnglish

Abstract

We study a model in which two parties compete by announcing their policies, after receiving conditionally independent private signals about the true state of the world. Parties are both office- and policy-motivated. Our model can explain radically different policy positions, even when parties receive identical signals and have unbiased preferences. This holds in an asymmetric equilibrium in which both parties reveal their private information to the voters and the implemented policy is (almost) first-best for all possible realizations of parties’ signals. In this equilibrium, one party adopts extreme and the other one moderate policy positions.

Bibliographic note

This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in European Economic Review. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in European Economic Review, 119, 2019 DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.07.005