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An analysis of consumer response to corruption: Italy's Calciopoli scandal

Research output: Working paper

Published

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An analysis of consumer response to corruption: Italy's Calciopoli scandal. / Buraimo, Babatunde; Migali, Giuseppe; Simmons, Robert.
Lancaster: Lancaster University, Department of Economics, 2014. (Economics Working Paper Series; Vol. 2014, No. 6).

Research output: Working paper

Harvard

Buraimo, B, Migali, G & Simmons, R 2014 'An analysis of consumer response to corruption: Italy's Calciopoli scandal' Economics Working Paper Series, no. 6, vol. 2014, Lancaster University, Department of Economics, Lancaster.

APA

Buraimo, B., Migali, G., & Simmons, R. (2014). An analysis of consumer response to corruption: Italy's Calciopoli scandal. (Economics Working Paper Series; Vol. 2014, No. 6). Lancaster University, Department of Economics.

Vancouver

Buraimo B, Migali G, Simmons R. An analysis of consumer response to corruption: Italy's Calciopoli scandal. Lancaster: Lancaster University, Department of Economics. 2014. (Economics Working Paper Series; 6).

Author

Buraimo, Babatunde ; Migali, Giuseppe ; Simmons, Robert. / An analysis of consumer response to corruption : Italy's Calciopoli scandal. Lancaster : Lancaster University, Department of Economics, 2014. (Economics Working Paper Series; 6).

Bibtex

@techreport{3b92f37d5ca54a31939b5dde2ce78262,
title = "An analysis of consumer response to corruption: Italy's Calciopoli scandal",
abstract = "The literature on economics of corruption is lacking in evidence on consumer responses to identifiable scandals. The Calciopoli episode affecting Italian football in the 2005/06 season serves as an opportunity for an empirical investigation into consumer (fan) behaviour following punishments imposed by the Italian league on clubs whose officials were found guilty of corrupt practices. Using a difference-in-difference estimation method, where the convicted teams are the treatment group, we find that home attendances for treated teams fell by around 16%, relative to control group teams defined as those clubs not subject to league-imposed punishment. We show further that the fall in attendances identified with Calciopoli punishment resulted in non-trivial gate revenue reductions. Our results suggest that a sizeable number of fans of the punished clubs were subsequently deterred from supporting their teams inside the stadium. We explore alternative explanations of this adverse fan response.",
keywords = "corruption, consumer demand, Calciopoli, football, attendances",
author = "Babatunde Buraimo and Giuseppe Migali and Robert Simmons",
year = "2014",
language = "English",
series = "Economics Working Paper Series",
publisher = "Lancaster University, Department of Economics",
number = "6",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Lancaster University, Department of Economics",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - An analysis of consumer response to corruption

T2 - Italy's Calciopoli scandal

AU - Buraimo, Babatunde

AU - Migali, Giuseppe

AU - Simmons, Robert

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - The literature on economics of corruption is lacking in evidence on consumer responses to identifiable scandals. The Calciopoli episode affecting Italian football in the 2005/06 season serves as an opportunity for an empirical investigation into consumer (fan) behaviour following punishments imposed by the Italian league on clubs whose officials were found guilty of corrupt practices. Using a difference-in-difference estimation method, where the convicted teams are the treatment group, we find that home attendances for treated teams fell by around 16%, relative to control group teams defined as those clubs not subject to league-imposed punishment. We show further that the fall in attendances identified with Calciopoli punishment resulted in non-trivial gate revenue reductions. Our results suggest that a sizeable number of fans of the punished clubs were subsequently deterred from supporting their teams inside the stadium. We explore alternative explanations of this adverse fan response.

AB - The literature on economics of corruption is lacking in evidence on consumer responses to identifiable scandals. The Calciopoli episode affecting Italian football in the 2005/06 season serves as an opportunity for an empirical investigation into consumer (fan) behaviour following punishments imposed by the Italian league on clubs whose officials were found guilty of corrupt practices. Using a difference-in-difference estimation method, where the convicted teams are the treatment group, we find that home attendances for treated teams fell by around 16%, relative to control group teams defined as those clubs not subject to league-imposed punishment. We show further that the fall in attendances identified with Calciopoli punishment resulted in non-trivial gate revenue reductions. Our results suggest that a sizeable number of fans of the punished clubs were subsequently deterred from supporting their teams inside the stadium. We explore alternative explanations of this adverse fan response.

KW - corruption

KW - consumer demand

KW - Calciopoli

KW - football

KW - attendances

M3 - Working paper

T3 - Economics Working Paper Series

BT - An analysis of consumer response to corruption

PB - Lancaster University, Department of Economics

CY - Lancaster

ER -