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    Rights statement: This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in British Journal for the Philosophy of Science following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version Sudipto Dasgupta, Alminas Žaldokas, Anticollusion Enforcement: Justice for Consumers and Equity for Firms, The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 32, Issue 7, July 2019 is available online at: https://academic.oup.com/rfs/article/32/7/2587/5079300

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Anti-Collusion Enforcements: Justice for Consumers and Equity for Firms

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal article

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Anti-Collusion Enforcements : Justice for Consumers and Equity for Firms. / Dasgupta, Sudipto; Zaldokas, Alminas.

In: Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 32, No. 7, 01.07.2019, p. 2587–2624.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal article

Harvard

Dasgupta, S & Zaldokas, A 2019, 'Anti-Collusion Enforcements: Justice for Consumers and Equity for Firms', Review of Financial Studies, vol. 32, no. 7, pp. 2587–2624. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhy094

APA

Vancouver

Author

Dasgupta, Sudipto ; Zaldokas, Alminas. / Anti-Collusion Enforcements : Justice for Consumers and Equity for Firms. In: Review of Financial Studies. 2019 ; Vol. 32, No. 7. pp. 2587–2624.

Bibtex

@article{87764cd76e6049c4b61476e84fd19589,
title = "Anti-Collusion Enforcements: Justice for Consumers and Equity for Firms",
abstract = "We consider the case of changing competition that comes from stronger antitrust enforcement around the world to show that, as the equilibrium switches from collusion to oligopolistic competition, firms step up investment and increase equity issuance. As a result, debt ratios fall. These results imply the importance of financial flexibility in surviving competitive threats. Our identification relies on a difference-in-differences estimation based on the staggered passage of leniency programs in 63 countries around the world from 1990 to 2012.",
author = "Sudipto Dasgupta and Alminas Zaldokas",
note = "This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in British Journal for the Philosophy of Science following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version Sudipto Dasgupta, Alminas {\v Z}aldokas, Anticollusion Enforcement: Justice for Consumers and Equity for Firms, The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 32, Issue 7, July 2019 is available online at: https://academic.oup.com/rfs/article/32/7/2587/5079300",
year = "2019",
month = jul,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1093/rfs/hhy094",
language = "English",
volume = "32",
pages = "2587–2624",
journal = "Review of Financial Studies",
issn = "0893-9454",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
number = "7",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Anti-Collusion Enforcements

T2 - Justice for Consumers and Equity for Firms

AU - Dasgupta, Sudipto

AU - Zaldokas, Alminas

N1 - This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in British Journal for the Philosophy of Science following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version Sudipto Dasgupta, Alminas Žaldokas, Anticollusion Enforcement: Justice for Consumers and Equity for Firms, The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 32, Issue 7, July 2019 is available online at: https://academic.oup.com/rfs/article/32/7/2587/5079300

PY - 2019/7/1

Y1 - 2019/7/1

N2 - We consider the case of changing competition that comes from stronger antitrust enforcement around the world to show that, as the equilibrium switches from collusion to oligopolistic competition, firms step up investment and increase equity issuance. As a result, debt ratios fall. These results imply the importance of financial flexibility in surviving competitive threats. Our identification relies on a difference-in-differences estimation based on the staggered passage of leniency programs in 63 countries around the world from 1990 to 2012.

AB - We consider the case of changing competition that comes from stronger antitrust enforcement around the world to show that, as the equilibrium switches from collusion to oligopolistic competition, firms step up investment and increase equity issuance. As a result, debt ratios fall. These results imply the importance of financial flexibility in surviving competitive threats. Our identification relies on a difference-in-differences estimation based on the staggered passage of leniency programs in 63 countries around the world from 1990 to 2012.

U2 - 10.1093/rfs/hhy094

DO - 10.1093/rfs/hhy094

M3 - Journal article

VL - 32

SP - 2587

EP - 2624

JO - Review of Financial Studies

JF - Review of Financial Studies

SN - 0893-9454

IS - 7

ER -