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Are US CEOs Paid More Than UK CEOs? Inferences From Risk-Adjusted Pay

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Are US CEOs Paid More Than UK CEOs? Inferences From Risk-Adjusted Pay. / Conyon, Martin; Core, John; Guay, Wayne R.
In: Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 24 , No. 2, 2011, p. 402-408.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Conyon, M, Core, J & Guay, WR 2011, 'Are US CEOs Paid More Than UK CEOs? Inferences From Risk-Adjusted Pay', Review of Financial Studies, vol. 24 , no. 2, pp. 402-408. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhq112

APA

Conyon, M., Core, J., & Guay, W. R. (2011). Are US CEOs Paid More Than UK CEOs? Inferences From Risk-Adjusted Pay. Review of Financial Studies, 24 (2), 402-408. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhq112

Vancouver

Conyon M, Core J, Guay WR. Are US CEOs Paid More Than UK CEOs? Inferences From Risk-Adjusted Pay. Review of Financial Studies. 2011;24 (2):402-408. doi: 10.1093/rfs/hhq112

Author

Conyon, Martin ; Core, John ; Guay, Wayne R. / Are US CEOs Paid More Than UK CEOs? Inferences From Risk-Adjusted Pay. In: Review of Financial Studies. 2011 ; Vol. 24 , No. 2. pp. 402-408.

Bibtex

@article{5372d746735a4749a906a9b9c8fba2e0,
title = "Are US CEOs Paid More Than UK CEOs? Inferences From Risk-Adjusted Pay",
abstract = "We compute and compare risk-adjusted CEO pay in the United States and United Kingdom, where the risk adjustment is based on estimated risk premiums stemming from the equity incentives borne by CEOs. Controlling for firm and industry characteristics, we find that U.S. CEOs have higher pay, but also bear much higher stock and option incentives than U.K. CEOs. Using reasonable estimates of risk premiums, we find that risk-adjusted U.S. CEO pay does not appear to be large compared to that of U.K. CEOs. We also examine differences in pay and equity incentives between a sample of non-U.K. European CEOs and a matched sample of U.S. CEOs, and find that risk-adjusting pay may explain about half of the apparent higher pay for U.S. CEOs",
keywords = "executive pay, remuneration",
author = "Martin Conyon and John Core and Guay, {Wayne R.}",
year = "2011",
doi = "10.1093/rfs/hhq112",
language = "English",
volume = "24 ",
pages = "402--408",
journal = "Review of Financial Studies",
issn = "0893-9454",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Are US CEOs Paid More Than UK CEOs? Inferences From Risk-Adjusted Pay

AU - Conyon, Martin

AU - Core, John

AU - Guay, Wayne R.

PY - 2011

Y1 - 2011

N2 - We compute and compare risk-adjusted CEO pay in the United States and United Kingdom, where the risk adjustment is based on estimated risk premiums stemming from the equity incentives borne by CEOs. Controlling for firm and industry characteristics, we find that U.S. CEOs have higher pay, but also bear much higher stock and option incentives than U.K. CEOs. Using reasonable estimates of risk premiums, we find that risk-adjusted U.S. CEO pay does not appear to be large compared to that of U.K. CEOs. We also examine differences in pay and equity incentives between a sample of non-U.K. European CEOs and a matched sample of U.S. CEOs, and find that risk-adjusting pay may explain about half of the apparent higher pay for U.S. CEOs

AB - We compute and compare risk-adjusted CEO pay in the United States and United Kingdom, where the risk adjustment is based on estimated risk premiums stemming from the equity incentives borne by CEOs. Controlling for firm and industry characteristics, we find that U.S. CEOs have higher pay, but also bear much higher stock and option incentives than U.K. CEOs. Using reasonable estimates of risk premiums, we find that risk-adjusted U.S. CEO pay does not appear to be large compared to that of U.K. CEOs. We also examine differences in pay and equity incentives between a sample of non-U.K. European CEOs and a matched sample of U.S. CEOs, and find that risk-adjusting pay may explain about half of the apparent higher pay for U.S. CEOs

KW - executive pay

KW - remuneration

U2 - 10.1093/rfs/hhq112

DO - 10.1093/rfs/hhq112

M3 - Journal article

VL - 24

SP - 402

EP - 408

JO - Review of Financial Studies

JF - Review of Financial Studies

SN - 0893-9454

IS - 2

ER -