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    Rights statement: The final, definitive version of this article has been published in the Journal, Philosophical Papers, 36 (3), 2007, © Informa Plc

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Aristotelian accounts of disease: what are they good for?

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Aristotelian accounts of disease: what are they good for? / Cooper, Rachel.
In: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 36, No. 3, 2007, p. 427-442.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Cooper, R 2007, 'Aristotelian accounts of disease: what are they good for?', Philosophical Papers, vol. 36, no. 3, pp. 427-442. https://doi.org/10.1080/05568640709485208

APA

Cooper, R. (2007). Aristotelian accounts of disease: what are they good for? Philosophical Papers, 36(3), 427-442. https://doi.org/10.1080/05568640709485208

Vancouver

Cooper R. Aristotelian accounts of disease: what are they good for? Philosophical Papers. 2007;36(3):427-442. doi: 10.1080/05568640709485208

Author

Cooper, Rachel. / Aristotelian accounts of disease : what are they good for?. In: Philosophical Papers. 2007 ; Vol. 36, No. 3. pp. 427-442.

Bibtex

@article{69c36234255542638f9b0d2837b67563,
title = "Aristotelian accounts of disease: what are they good for?",
abstract = "In this paper I will argue that Aristotelian accounts of disease cannot provide us with an adequate descriptive account of our concept of disease. In other words, they fail to classify conditions as either diseases, or non-diseases, in a way that is consistent with commonplace intuitions. This being said, Aristotelian accounts of disease are not worthless. Aristotelian approaches cannot offer a decent descriptive account of our concept of disease, but they do offer resources for improving on the ways in which we think about the harms that afflict human beings. While they cannot offer an account of {\textquoteleft}disease{\textquoteright} they can offer an account of {\textquoteleft}harm{\textquoteright}-and this it turns out, is ultimately of greater importance.",
author = "Rachel Cooper",
note = "The final, definitive version of this article has been published in the Journal, Philosophical Papers, 36 (3), 2007, {\textcopyright} Informa Plc",
year = "2007",
doi = "10.1080/05568640709485208",
language = "English",
volume = "36",
pages = "427--442",
journal = "Philosophical Papers",
issn = "0556-8641",
publisher = "Taylor and Francis Ltd.",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Aristotelian accounts of disease

T2 - what are they good for?

AU - Cooper, Rachel

N1 - The final, definitive version of this article has been published in the Journal, Philosophical Papers, 36 (3), 2007, © Informa Plc

PY - 2007

Y1 - 2007

N2 - In this paper I will argue that Aristotelian accounts of disease cannot provide us with an adequate descriptive account of our concept of disease. In other words, they fail to classify conditions as either diseases, or non-diseases, in a way that is consistent with commonplace intuitions. This being said, Aristotelian accounts of disease are not worthless. Aristotelian approaches cannot offer a decent descriptive account of our concept of disease, but they do offer resources for improving on the ways in which we think about the harms that afflict human beings. While they cannot offer an account of ‘disease’ they can offer an account of ‘harm’-and this it turns out, is ultimately of greater importance.

AB - In this paper I will argue that Aristotelian accounts of disease cannot provide us with an adequate descriptive account of our concept of disease. In other words, they fail to classify conditions as either diseases, or non-diseases, in a way that is consistent with commonplace intuitions. This being said, Aristotelian accounts of disease are not worthless. Aristotelian approaches cannot offer a decent descriptive account of our concept of disease, but they do offer resources for improving on the ways in which we think about the harms that afflict human beings. While they cannot offer an account of ‘disease’ they can offer an account of ‘harm’-and this it turns out, is ultimately of greater importance.

U2 - 10.1080/05568640709485208

DO - 10.1080/05568640709485208

M3 - Journal article

VL - 36

SP - 427

EP - 442

JO - Philosophical Papers

JF - Philosophical Papers

SN - 0556-8641

IS - 3

ER -