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Assessing the Impact of Malware Attacks in Utility Networks

Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSN › Other chapter contribution

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Assessing the Impact of Malware Attacks in Utility Networks. / König, Sandra; Gouglidis, Antonios; Green, Benjamin et al.
Game Theory for Security and Risk Management: From Theory to Practice. ed. / Stefan Rass; Stefan Schauer. Springer Birkhäuser, 2018. p. 335-351 (Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications).

Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSN › Other chapter contribution

Harvard

König, S, Gouglidis, A, Green, B & Solar, A 2018, Assessing the Impact of Malware Attacks in Utility Networks. in S Rass & S Schauer (eds), Game Theory for Security and Risk Management: From Theory to Practice. Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications, Springer Birkhäuser, pp. 335-351. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75268-6_14

APA

König, S., Gouglidis, A., Green, B., & Solar, A. (2018). Assessing the Impact of Malware Attacks in Utility Networks. In S. Rass, & S. Schauer (Eds.), Game Theory for Security and Risk Management: From Theory to Practice (pp. 335-351). (Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications). Springer Birkhäuser. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75268-6_14

Vancouver

König S, Gouglidis A, Green B, Solar A. Assessing the Impact of Malware Attacks in Utility Networks. In Rass S, Schauer S, editors, Game Theory for Security and Risk Management: From Theory to Practice. Springer Birkhäuser. 2018. p. 335-351. (Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications). doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-75268-6_14

Author

König, Sandra ; Gouglidis, Antonios ; Green, Benjamin et al. / Assessing the Impact of Malware Attacks in Utility Networks. Game Theory for Security and Risk Management: From Theory to Practice. editor / Stefan Rass ; Stefan Schauer. Springer Birkhäuser, 2018. pp. 335-351 (Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications).

Bibtex

@inbook{aeabe3f3e8d24636a215690c8ca398f8,
title = "Assessing the Impact of Malware Attacks in Utility Networks",
abstract = "Utility networks are becoming more and more interconnected. Besides the natural physical interdependencies (e.g., water networks heavily depend on power grids, etc.), utility networks are nowadays often monitored and operated by industrial control systems (ICS). While these systems enhance the level of control over utility networks, they also enable new forms of attacks, such as cyberattacks. During the last years, cyberattacks have occurred more frequently with sometimes a significant impact on the company as well as the society. The first step toward preventing such incidents is to understand how an infection of one component influences the rest of the network. This malware spreading can be modeled as a stochastic process on a graph where edges transmit an infection with a specific probability. In practice, this probability depends on the type of the malware (e.g., ransomware, spyware, virus, etc.) as well as on the type of the connection between the nodes (e.g., physical or logical connections). In this chapter, we illustrate how the abstract model can be put into practice for a concrete use case.",
author = "Sandra K{\"o}nig and Antonios Gouglidis and Benjamin Green and Alma Solar",
year = "2018",
month = jul,
day = "7",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-319-75268-6_14",
language = "English",
isbn = "9783319752679",
series = "Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications",
publisher = "Springer Birkh{\"a}user",
pages = "335--351",
editor = "Stefan Rass and Stefan Schauer",
booktitle = "Game Theory for Security and Risk Management",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - Assessing the Impact of Malware Attacks in Utility Networks

AU - König, Sandra

AU - Gouglidis, Antonios

AU - Green, Benjamin

AU - Solar, Alma

PY - 2018/7/7

Y1 - 2018/7/7

N2 - Utility networks are becoming more and more interconnected. Besides the natural physical interdependencies (e.g., water networks heavily depend on power grids, etc.), utility networks are nowadays often monitored and operated by industrial control systems (ICS). While these systems enhance the level of control over utility networks, they also enable new forms of attacks, such as cyberattacks. During the last years, cyberattacks have occurred more frequently with sometimes a significant impact on the company as well as the society. The first step toward preventing such incidents is to understand how an infection of one component influences the rest of the network. This malware spreading can be modeled as a stochastic process on a graph where edges transmit an infection with a specific probability. In practice, this probability depends on the type of the malware (e.g., ransomware, spyware, virus, etc.) as well as on the type of the connection between the nodes (e.g., physical or logical connections). In this chapter, we illustrate how the abstract model can be put into practice for a concrete use case.

AB - Utility networks are becoming more and more interconnected. Besides the natural physical interdependencies (e.g., water networks heavily depend on power grids, etc.), utility networks are nowadays often monitored and operated by industrial control systems (ICS). While these systems enhance the level of control over utility networks, they also enable new forms of attacks, such as cyberattacks. During the last years, cyberattacks have occurred more frequently with sometimes a significant impact on the company as well as the society. The first step toward preventing such incidents is to understand how an infection of one component influences the rest of the network. This malware spreading can be modeled as a stochastic process on a graph where edges transmit an infection with a specific probability. In practice, this probability depends on the type of the malware (e.g., ransomware, spyware, virus, etc.) as well as on the type of the connection between the nodes (e.g., physical or logical connections). In this chapter, we illustrate how the abstract model can be put into practice for a concrete use case.

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-75268-6_14

DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-75268-6_14

M3 - Other chapter contribution

SN - 9783319752679

T3 - Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations and Applications

SP - 335

EP - 351

BT - Game Theory for Security and Risk Management

A2 - Rass, Stefan

A2 - Schauer, Stefan

PB - Springer Birkhäuser

ER -