Home > Research > Publications & Outputs > Auctions with cross-shareholdings

Research

Links

Text available via DOI:

Keywords

View graph of relations

Auctions with cross-shareholdings

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Published

Standard

Auctions with cross-shareholdings. / Dasgupta, Sudipto; Tsui, Kevin.
In: Economic Theory, Vol. 24, No. 1, 07.2004, p. 163-194.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Dasgupta, S & Tsui, K 2004, 'Auctions with cross-shareholdings', Economic Theory, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 163-194. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-003-0407-y

APA

Dasgupta, S., & Tsui, K. (2004). Auctions with cross-shareholdings. Economic Theory, 24(1), 163-194. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-003-0407-y

Vancouver

Dasgupta S, Tsui K. Auctions with cross-shareholdings. Economic Theory. 2004 Jul;24(1):163-194. doi: 10.1007/s00199-003-0407-y

Author

Dasgupta, Sudipto ; Tsui, Kevin. / Auctions with cross-shareholdings. In: Economic Theory. 2004 ; Vol. 24, No. 1. pp. 163-194.

Bibtex

@article{442bde28e6b94f599eaf55793e35bd69,
title = "Auctions with cross-shareholdings",
abstract = "We study the effect of cross-shareholding among two competing firmson their bidding behavior and the expected sales revenue for the seller in an auction environment. The bidders{\textquoteright} private signals are independent, and the model encompasses the private values model and a particular common value model as special cases. When cross-shareholding is symmetric, the bids decrease towards the collusive level as the degree of cross-shareholding increases. The Revenue Equivalence result no longer holds: the first-price auction generates higher expected revenue for the seller than the second-price auction.With asymmetric cross-shareholding, revenue comparisons are only possible in the common value setting. Expected revenue for the seller is again higher in the first-price than in the second price auction. Bidding behavior in the second-price auction is more sensitive to changes in cross-shareholding and the value environment than in the first-price auction.",
keywords = "Cross-shareholdings, Auctions, Bidding, Revenue equivalence",
author = "Sudipto Dasgupta and Kevin Tsui",
year = "2004",
month = jul,
doi = "10.1007/s00199-003-0407-y",
language = "English",
volume = "24",
pages = "163--194",
journal = "Economic Theory",
issn = "0938-2259",
publisher = "Springer-Verlag,",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Auctions with cross-shareholdings

AU - Dasgupta, Sudipto

AU - Tsui, Kevin

PY - 2004/7

Y1 - 2004/7

N2 - We study the effect of cross-shareholding among two competing firmson their bidding behavior and the expected sales revenue for the seller in an auction environment. The bidders’ private signals are independent, and the model encompasses the private values model and a particular common value model as special cases. When cross-shareholding is symmetric, the bids decrease towards the collusive level as the degree of cross-shareholding increases. The Revenue Equivalence result no longer holds: the first-price auction generates higher expected revenue for the seller than the second-price auction.With asymmetric cross-shareholding, revenue comparisons are only possible in the common value setting. Expected revenue for the seller is again higher in the first-price than in the second price auction. Bidding behavior in the second-price auction is more sensitive to changes in cross-shareholding and the value environment than in the first-price auction.

AB - We study the effect of cross-shareholding among two competing firmson their bidding behavior and the expected sales revenue for the seller in an auction environment. The bidders’ private signals are independent, and the model encompasses the private values model and a particular common value model as special cases. When cross-shareholding is symmetric, the bids decrease towards the collusive level as the degree of cross-shareholding increases. The Revenue Equivalence result no longer holds: the first-price auction generates higher expected revenue for the seller than the second-price auction.With asymmetric cross-shareholding, revenue comparisons are only possible in the common value setting. Expected revenue for the seller is again higher in the first-price than in the second price auction. Bidding behavior in the second-price auction is more sensitive to changes in cross-shareholding and the value environment than in the first-price auction.

KW - Cross-shareholdings

KW - Auctions

KW - Bidding

KW - Revenue equivalence

U2 - 10.1007/s00199-003-0407-y

DO - 10.1007/s00199-003-0407-y

M3 - Journal article

VL - 24

SP - 163

EP - 194

JO - Economic Theory

JF - Economic Theory

SN - 0938-2259

IS - 1

ER -