Auditor independence and incentives

Accounting and Finance

Keywords

Auditor independence, audit services, incentives , nonaudit services

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Published

Standard

Auditor independence and incentives. / Lubberink, Martien ; Yin, Judy.
In: International Research Journal of Applied Finance, Vol. IV, No. 10, 01.10.2013, p. 1326-1334.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Lubberink, M & Yin, J 2013, 'Auditor independence and incentives', International Research Journal of Applied Finance, vol. IV, no. 10, pp. 1326-1334. <https://www.irjaf.com/uploads/IRJAF_Vol_IV_Issue_10_October_2013.pdf>

APA

Lubberink, M., & Yin, J. (2013). Auditor independence and incentives. International Research Journal of Applied Finance, IV(10), 1326-1334. https://www.irjaf.com/uploads/IRJAF_Vol_IV_Issue_10_October_2013.pdf

Vancouver

Lubberink M , Yin J. Auditor independence and incentives. International Research Journal of Applied Finance. 2013 Oct 1;IV(10):1326-1334.

Author

Lubberink, Martien ; Yin, Judy. / Auditor independence and incentives. In: International Research Journal of Applied Finance. 2013 ; Vol. IV, No. 10. pp. 1326-1334.

Bibtex

@article{99caae10babf41cb9ca46e1a4f98e162,

title = "Auditor independence and incentives",

abstract = "This paper presents two methods of changing the incentives that auditors face with the goal of allowing an audit firm to continue to provide both audit an d nonaudit services (NAS). The first method requires audit firm employees (both auditors and N AS providers) to deposit a substantial share of their revenues into an individual escrow accoun t. If any material misstatements are uncovered in the published financial statements of their clien t, they lose their entitlement to the escrow account funds. The second method taxes NAS and re wards the auditor for knowledge acquisition, and for referring these clients to the N AS providers. Both methods are likely to lead to an augmentation of the quality of the services provide d by an audit firm. Further, they tend to lower the need for one-size fits all measures. ",

keywords = "Auditor independence, audit services, incentives , nonaudit services",

author = "Martien Lubberink and Judy Yin",

year = "2013",

month = oct,

day = "1",

language = "English",

volume = "IV",

pages = "1326--1334",

journal = "International Research Journal of Applied Finance",

issn = "2229-6891",

number = "10",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Auditor independence and incentives

AU - Lubberink, Martien

AU - Yin, Judy

PY - 2013/10/1

Y1 - 2013/10/1

N2 - This paper presents two methods of changing the incentives that auditors face with the goal of allowing an audit firm to continue to provide both audit an d nonaudit services (NAS). The first method requires audit firm employees (both auditors and N AS providers) to deposit a substantial share of their revenues into an individual escrow accoun t. If any material misstatements are uncovered in the published financial statements of their clien t, they lose their entitlement to the escrow account funds. The second method taxes NAS and re wards the auditor for knowledge acquisition, and for referring these clients to the N AS providers. Both methods are likely to lead to an augmentation of the quality of the services provide d by an audit firm. Further, they tend to lower the need for one-size fits all measures.

AB - This paper presents two methods of changing the incentives that auditors face with the goal of allowing an audit firm to continue to provide both audit an d nonaudit services (NAS). The first method requires audit firm employees (both auditors and N AS providers) to deposit a substantial share of their revenues into an individual escrow accoun t. If any material misstatements are uncovered in the published financial statements of their clien t, they lose their entitlement to the escrow account funds. The second method taxes NAS and re wards the auditor for knowledge acquisition, and for referring these clients to the N AS providers. Both methods are likely to lead to an augmentation of the quality of the services provide d by an audit firm. Further, they tend to lower the need for one-size fits all measures.

KW - Auditor independence

KW - audit services

KW - incentives

KW - nonaudit services

M3 - Journal article

VL - IV

SP - 1326

EP - 1334

JO - International Research Journal of Applied Finance

JF - International Research Journal of Applied Finance

SN - 2229-6891

IS - 10

ER -

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