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Bank governance, regulation, supervision, and risk reporting: evidence from operational risk disclosures in European banks

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Bank governance, regulation, supervision, and risk reporting : evidence from operational risk disclosures in European banks. / Barakat, Ahmed; Hussainey, Khaled.

In: International Review of Financial Analysis, Vol. 30, 12.2013, p. 254-273.

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Barakat, Ahmed ; Hussainey, Khaled. / Bank governance, regulation, supervision, and risk reporting : evidence from operational risk disclosures in European banks. In: International Review of Financial Analysis. 2013 ; Vol. 30. pp. 254-273.

Bibtex

@article{cccf5a08a1b844f191bc6dd1a382a3bf,
title = "Bank governance, regulation, supervision, and risk reporting: evidence from operational risk disclosures in European banks",
abstract = "This paper investigates the direct and joint effects of bank governance, regulation, and supervision on the quality of risk reporting in the banking industry, as proxied for by operational risk disclosure (ORD) quality in European banks. After controlling for the endogeneity between bank stability and risk reporting quality, we find that banks having a higher proportion of outside board directors, lower executive ownership, concentrated outside non-governmental ownership, and more active audit committee, and operating under regulations promoting bank competition (i.e., less stringent entry to banking requirements) provide ORD of higher quality. In addition, we find that the contribution of bank supervisors to the enhancement of ORD quality depends on the ownership structure of the bank. Specifically, powerful and independent bank supervisors mitigate the incentives for entrenched bank executives to withhold voluntary ORD. Moreover, bank supervisors and largest shareholders perform substitutive roles in monitoring the bank management's compliance with mandatory ORD requirements. For the sake of enhancing risk reporting quality in banks, our findings recommend sustaining board independence, enhancing audit committee activity, easing entry to banking requirements, and promoting a more proactive role for bank supervisors.",
keywords = "Bank regulation and supervision, Basel II (Pillar 3), Corporate governance, European banks, Operational risk disclosure",
author = "Ahmed Barakat and Khaled Hussainey",
year = "2013",
month = dec
doi = "10.1016/j.irfa.2013.07.002",
language = "English",
volume = "30",
pages = "254--273",
journal = "International Review of Financial Analysis",
issn = "1057-5219",
publisher = "Elsevier Inc.",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Bank governance, regulation, supervision, and risk reporting

T2 - evidence from operational risk disclosures in European banks

AU - Barakat, Ahmed

AU - Hussainey, Khaled

PY - 2013/12

Y1 - 2013/12

N2 - This paper investigates the direct and joint effects of bank governance, regulation, and supervision on the quality of risk reporting in the banking industry, as proxied for by operational risk disclosure (ORD) quality in European banks. After controlling for the endogeneity between bank stability and risk reporting quality, we find that banks having a higher proportion of outside board directors, lower executive ownership, concentrated outside non-governmental ownership, and more active audit committee, and operating under regulations promoting bank competition (i.e., less stringent entry to banking requirements) provide ORD of higher quality. In addition, we find that the contribution of bank supervisors to the enhancement of ORD quality depends on the ownership structure of the bank. Specifically, powerful and independent bank supervisors mitigate the incentives for entrenched bank executives to withhold voluntary ORD. Moreover, bank supervisors and largest shareholders perform substitutive roles in monitoring the bank management's compliance with mandatory ORD requirements. For the sake of enhancing risk reporting quality in banks, our findings recommend sustaining board independence, enhancing audit committee activity, easing entry to banking requirements, and promoting a more proactive role for bank supervisors.

AB - This paper investigates the direct and joint effects of bank governance, regulation, and supervision on the quality of risk reporting in the banking industry, as proxied for by operational risk disclosure (ORD) quality in European banks. After controlling for the endogeneity between bank stability and risk reporting quality, we find that banks having a higher proportion of outside board directors, lower executive ownership, concentrated outside non-governmental ownership, and more active audit committee, and operating under regulations promoting bank competition (i.e., less stringent entry to banking requirements) provide ORD of higher quality. In addition, we find that the contribution of bank supervisors to the enhancement of ORD quality depends on the ownership structure of the bank. Specifically, powerful and independent bank supervisors mitigate the incentives for entrenched bank executives to withhold voluntary ORD. Moreover, bank supervisors and largest shareholders perform substitutive roles in monitoring the bank management's compliance with mandatory ORD requirements. For the sake of enhancing risk reporting quality in banks, our findings recommend sustaining board independence, enhancing audit committee activity, easing entry to banking requirements, and promoting a more proactive role for bank supervisors.

KW - Bank regulation and supervision

KW - Basel II (Pillar 3)

KW - Corporate governance

KW - European banks

KW - Operational risk disclosure

U2 - 10.1016/j.irfa.2013.07.002

DO - 10.1016/j.irfa.2013.07.002

M3 - Journal article

VL - 30

SP - 254

EP - 273

JO - International Review of Financial Analysis

JF - International Review of Financial Analysis

SN - 1057-5219

ER -