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Bank-firm relationships: a review of the implications for firms and banks in normal and crisis times

Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSNChapter

Published

Standard

Bank-firm relationships: a review of the implications for firms and banks in normal and crisis times. / Ioannidou, Vasso; Degryse, Hans ; Ongena, Steven.
The Economics of Network. ed. / Tsutomu Watanabe; Iichiro Uesugi; Arito Ono . Springer Japan 2015, 2015.

Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSNChapter

Harvard

Ioannidou, V, Degryse, H & Ongena, S 2015, Bank-firm relationships: a review of the implications for firms and banks in normal and crisis times. in T Watanabe, I Uesugi & A Ono (eds), The Economics of Network. Springer Japan 2015.

APA

Ioannidou, V., Degryse, H., & Ongena, S. (2015). Bank-firm relationships: a review of the implications for firms and banks in normal and crisis times. In T. Watanabe, I. Uesugi, & A. Ono (Eds.), The Economics of Network Springer Japan 2015.

Vancouver

Ioannidou V, Degryse H, Ongena S. Bank-firm relationships: a review of the implications for firms and banks in normal and crisis times. In Watanabe T, Uesugi I, Ono A, editors, The Economics of Network. Springer Japan 2015. 2015

Author

Ioannidou, Vasso ; Degryse, Hans ; Ongena, Steven. / Bank-firm relationships : a review of the implications for firms and banks in normal and crisis times. The Economics of Network. editor / Tsutomu Watanabe ; Iichiro Uesugi ; Arito Ono . Springer Japan 2015, 2015.

Bibtex

@inbook{5833af79a4394325a01e85b037feb9bb,
title = "Bank-firm relationships: a review of the implications for firms and banks in normal and crisis times",
abstract = "Banks are important providers of external finance to firms. In order to solve asymmetric information problems, firms and banks often engage in bank-firm relationships. Relationship banking occurs when a bank and a borrower enter multiple mutual interactions and both parties invest in obtaining some counterparty specific information, binding bank and firm, to a certain degree, to each other. This chapter starts with a discussion of reasons for having exclusive versus non-exclusive relationships. It provides a concise overview on the determinants of the number and intensity of bank-firm relationships, and reviews how relationship banking generates costs and benefits for both banks and firms. We show that on average bank-firm relationships generate value for both. The costs and benefits of bank-firm relationships, however, vary substantially with whether an economy is in normal or crisis times",
author = "Vasso Ioannidou and Hans Degryse and Steven Ongena",
year = "2015",
language = "English",
editor = "Tsutomu Watanabe and Uesugi, {Iichiro } and {Ono }, {Arito }",
booktitle = "The Economics of Network",
publisher = "Springer Japan 2015",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - Bank-firm relationships

T2 - a review of the implications for firms and banks in normal and crisis times

AU - Ioannidou, Vasso

AU - Degryse, Hans

AU - Ongena, Steven

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - Banks are important providers of external finance to firms. In order to solve asymmetric information problems, firms and banks often engage in bank-firm relationships. Relationship banking occurs when a bank and a borrower enter multiple mutual interactions and both parties invest in obtaining some counterparty specific information, binding bank and firm, to a certain degree, to each other. This chapter starts with a discussion of reasons for having exclusive versus non-exclusive relationships. It provides a concise overview on the determinants of the number and intensity of bank-firm relationships, and reviews how relationship banking generates costs and benefits for both banks and firms. We show that on average bank-firm relationships generate value for both. The costs and benefits of bank-firm relationships, however, vary substantially with whether an economy is in normal or crisis times

AB - Banks are important providers of external finance to firms. In order to solve asymmetric information problems, firms and banks often engage in bank-firm relationships. Relationship banking occurs when a bank and a borrower enter multiple mutual interactions and both parties invest in obtaining some counterparty specific information, binding bank and firm, to a certain degree, to each other. This chapter starts with a discussion of reasons for having exclusive versus non-exclusive relationships. It provides a concise overview on the determinants of the number and intensity of bank-firm relationships, and reviews how relationship banking generates costs and benefits for both banks and firms. We show that on average bank-firm relationships generate value for both. The costs and benefits of bank-firm relationships, however, vary substantially with whether an economy is in normal or crisis times

M3 - Chapter

BT - The Economics of Network

A2 - Watanabe, Tsutomu

A2 - Uesugi, Iichiro

A2 - Ono , Arito

PB - Springer Japan 2015

ER -