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Bicameral Conflict Resolution in the European Union: An Empirical Analysis of Conciliation Committee Bargains

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Bicameral Conflict Resolution in the European Union : An Empirical Analysis of Conciliation Committee Bargains. / Koenig, Thomas; Lindberg, Bjorn; Nolte (Lechner), Sandra; Pohlmeier, Winfried.

In: British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 37, No. 2, 04.2007, p. 281–312.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal article

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Koenig, T, Lindberg, B, Nolte (Lechner), S & Pohlmeier, W 2007, 'Bicameral Conflict Resolution in the European Union: An Empirical Analysis of Conciliation Committee Bargains', British Journal of Political Science, vol. 37, no. 2, pp. 281–312. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123407000142

APA

Vancouver

Author

Koenig, Thomas ; Lindberg, Bjorn ; Nolte (Lechner), Sandra ; Pohlmeier, Winfried. / Bicameral Conflict Resolution in the European Union : An Empirical Analysis of Conciliation Committee Bargains. In: British Journal of Political Science. 2007 ; Vol. 37, No. 2. pp. 281–312.

Bibtex

@article{2a56f86a1233472aa00ee53939b2afbf,
title = "Bicameral Conflict Resolution in the European Union: An Empirical Analysis of Conciliation Committee Bargains",
abstract = "This article is a study of bicameral conflict resolution between the Council and the European Parliament in the European Union, which has established a bicameral conciliation process under the co-decision procedure. Scholars commonly agree that the European Parliament has gained power under the co-decision procedure, but the impact of the conciliation process on the power distribution between the Council and the European Parliament remains unclear. The scholarly debate suggests that the power of the institutional actors depends on their proximity to the status quo, the (im-)patience and the specific preference distribution of the institutional actors, although most analyses assume that the Commission plays an insignificant role. Using an ordered probit model, this study examines the power distribution between the two institutional actors, the factors for their bargaining success and the role of the Commission in the period between 1999 and 2002. The findings show that the European Parliament wins most conflicts, but that the Council is more successful in multi-dimensional disputes. The results confirm some theoretical claims made in the literature, such as the importance of the status quo location and of preference cohesiveness. However, they also reject a major assumption in the literature on the irrelevance of the Commission in the conciliation process, which we show to have an influential informational position for parliamentary success.",
author = "Thomas Koenig and Bjorn Lindberg and {Nolte (Lechner)}, Sandra and Winfried Pohlmeier",
year = "2007",
month = apr
doi = "10.1017/S0007123407000142",
language = "English",
volume = "37",
pages = "281–312",
journal = "British Journal of Political Science",
issn = "0007-1234",
publisher = "Cambridge University Press",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Bicameral Conflict Resolution in the European Union

T2 - An Empirical Analysis of Conciliation Committee Bargains

AU - Koenig, Thomas

AU - Lindberg, Bjorn

AU - Nolte (Lechner), Sandra

AU - Pohlmeier, Winfried

PY - 2007/4

Y1 - 2007/4

N2 - This article is a study of bicameral conflict resolution between the Council and the European Parliament in the European Union, which has established a bicameral conciliation process under the co-decision procedure. Scholars commonly agree that the European Parliament has gained power under the co-decision procedure, but the impact of the conciliation process on the power distribution between the Council and the European Parliament remains unclear. The scholarly debate suggests that the power of the institutional actors depends on their proximity to the status quo, the (im-)patience and the specific preference distribution of the institutional actors, although most analyses assume that the Commission plays an insignificant role. Using an ordered probit model, this study examines the power distribution between the two institutional actors, the factors for their bargaining success and the role of the Commission in the period between 1999 and 2002. The findings show that the European Parliament wins most conflicts, but that the Council is more successful in multi-dimensional disputes. The results confirm some theoretical claims made in the literature, such as the importance of the status quo location and of preference cohesiveness. However, they also reject a major assumption in the literature on the irrelevance of the Commission in the conciliation process, which we show to have an influential informational position for parliamentary success.

AB - This article is a study of bicameral conflict resolution between the Council and the European Parliament in the European Union, which has established a bicameral conciliation process under the co-decision procedure. Scholars commonly agree that the European Parliament has gained power under the co-decision procedure, but the impact of the conciliation process on the power distribution between the Council and the European Parliament remains unclear. The scholarly debate suggests that the power of the institutional actors depends on their proximity to the status quo, the (im-)patience and the specific preference distribution of the institutional actors, although most analyses assume that the Commission plays an insignificant role. Using an ordered probit model, this study examines the power distribution between the two institutional actors, the factors for their bargaining success and the role of the Commission in the period between 1999 and 2002. The findings show that the European Parliament wins most conflicts, but that the Council is more successful in multi-dimensional disputes. The results confirm some theoretical claims made in the literature, such as the importance of the status quo location and of preference cohesiveness. However, they also reject a major assumption in the literature on the irrelevance of the Commission in the conciliation process, which we show to have an influential informational position for parliamentary success.

U2 - 10.1017/S0007123407000142

DO - 10.1017/S0007123407000142

M3 - Journal article

VL - 37

SP - 281

EP - 312

JO - British Journal of Political Science

JF - British Journal of Political Science

SN - 0007-1234

IS - 2

ER -