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Brains, vats and neurally-controlled animats.

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Brains, vats and neurally-controlled animats. / Manson, Neil C.
In: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, Vol. 35, No. 2, 2004, p. 249-268.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Manson, NC 2004, 'Brains, vats and neurally-controlled animats.', Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, vol. 35, no. 2, pp. 249-268. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2004.03.004

APA

Manson, N. C. (2004). Brains, vats and neurally-controlled animats. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 35(2), 249-268. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2004.03.004

Vancouver

Manson NC. Brains, vats and neurally-controlled animats. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences. 2004;35(2):249-268. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsc.2004.03.004

Author

Manson, Neil C. / Brains, vats and neurally-controlled animats. In: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences. 2004 ; Vol. 35, No. 2. pp. 249-268.

Bibtex

@article{a1877fcabdb04b5c87ac75755c58891f,
title = "Brains, vats and neurally-controlled animats.",
abstract = "The modern vat-brain debate is an epistemological one, and it focuses on the point of view a putatively deceived subject. Semantic externalists argue that we cannot coherently wonder whether we are brains in vats. This paper examines a new experimental paradigm for cognitive neuroscience {\^a}�� the neurally-controlled animat (NCA) paradigm {\^a}�� that seems to have a great deal in common with the vat-brain scenario. Neural cells are provided with a simulated body within an artificial world in order to study the brain both in vitro and in vivo. Given the similarity between the NCA scenario and the vat-brain scenario semantic externalism seems to undermine the utility of the NCA methodology. Three initial responses to the externalist challenge are offered. A fourth response clarifies the distinctive theoretical background to the NCA in {\^a}��artificial life{\^a}�� and, in doing so, we uncover an anti-representationalist conception of the NCA. This distances the NCA paradigm from externalist objections and casts cognitive neuroscience, and the vat-brain debate, in a new light.",
keywords = "brain in a vat, Putnam, externalism, animats, extended cognition, anti-representationalism",
author = "Manson, {Neil C.}",
year = "2004",
doi = "10.1016/j.shpsc.2004.03.004",
language = "English",
volume = "35",
pages = "249--268",
journal = "Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences",
issn = "1369-8486",
publisher = "Elsevier Limited",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Brains, vats and neurally-controlled animats.

AU - Manson, Neil C.

PY - 2004

Y1 - 2004

N2 - The modern vat-brain debate is an epistemological one, and it focuses on the point of view a putatively deceived subject. Semantic externalists argue that we cannot coherently wonder whether we are brains in vats. This paper examines a new experimental paradigm for cognitive neuroscience � the neurally-controlled animat (NCA) paradigm � that seems to have a great deal in common with the vat-brain scenario. Neural cells are provided with a simulated body within an artificial world in order to study the brain both in vitro and in vivo. Given the similarity between the NCA scenario and the vat-brain scenario semantic externalism seems to undermine the utility of the NCA methodology. Three initial responses to the externalist challenge are offered. A fourth response clarifies the distinctive theoretical background to the NCA in �artificial life� and, in doing so, we uncover an anti-representationalist conception of the NCA. This distances the NCA paradigm from externalist objections and casts cognitive neuroscience, and the vat-brain debate, in a new light.

AB - The modern vat-brain debate is an epistemological one, and it focuses on the point of view a putatively deceived subject. Semantic externalists argue that we cannot coherently wonder whether we are brains in vats. This paper examines a new experimental paradigm for cognitive neuroscience � the neurally-controlled animat (NCA) paradigm � that seems to have a great deal in common with the vat-brain scenario. Neural cells are provided with a simulated body within an artificial world in order to study the brain both in vitro and in vivo. Given the similarity between the NCA scenario and the vat-brain scenario semantic externalism seems to undermine the utility of the NCA methodology. Three initial responses to the externalist challenge are offered. A fourth response clarifies the distinctive theoretical background to the NCA in �artificial life� and, in doing so, we uncover an anti-representationalist conception of the NCA. This distances the NCA paradigm from externalist objections and casts cognitive neuroscience, and the vat-brain debate, in a new light.

KW - brain in a vat

KW - Putnam

KW - externalism

KW - animats

KW - extended cognition

KW - anti-representationalism

U2 - 10.1016/j.shpsc.2004.03.004

DO - 10.1016/j.shpsc.2004.03.004

M3 - Journal article

VL - 35

SP - 249

EP - 268

JO - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences

JF - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences

SN - 1369-8486

IS - 2

ER -