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Comparing and fusing different sensor modalities for relay attack resistance in Zero-Interaction Authentication

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Comparing and fusing different sensor modalities for relay attack resistance in Zero-Interaction Authentication. / Truong, H. T. T.; Gao, Xiang; Shrestha, B.; Saxena, N.; Asokan, N.; Nurmi, P.

2014 IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications (PerCom). IEEE, 2014. p. 163-171.

Research output: Contribution in Book/Report/Proceedings - With ISBN/ISSNConference contribution/Paper

Harvard

Truong, HTT, Gao, X, Shrestha, B, Saxena, N, Asokan, N & Nurmi, P 2014, Comparing and fusing different sensor modalities for relay attack resistance in Zero-Interaction Authentication. in 2014 IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications (PerCom). IEEE, pp. 163-171. https://doi.org/10.1109/PerCom.2014.6813957

APA

Truong, H. T. T., Gao, X., Shrestha, B., Saxena, N., Asokan, N., & Nurmi, P. (2014). Comparing and fusing different sensor modalities for relay attack resistance in Zero-Interaction Authentication. In 2014 IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications (PerCom) (pp. 163-171). IEEE. https://doi.org/10.1109/PerCom.2014.6813957

Vancouver

Truong HTT, Gao X, Shrestha B, Saxena N, Asokan N, Nurmi P. Comparing and fusing different sensor modalities for relay attack resistance in Zero-Interaction Authentication. In 2014 IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications (PerCom). IEEE. 2014. p. 163-171 https://doi.org/10.1109/PerCom.2014.6813957

Author

Truong, H. T. T. ; Gao, Xiang ; Shrestha, B. ; Saxena, N. ; Asokan, N. ; Nurmi, P. / Comparing and fusing different sensor modalities for relay attack resistance in Zero-Interaction Authentication. 2014 IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications (PerCom). IEEE, 2014. pp. 163-171

Bibtex

@inproceedings{e08e28658acc4d7f9a4d1c745d9b7433,
title = "Comparing and fusing different sensor modalities for relay attack resistance in Zero-Interaction Authentication",
abstract = "Zero-Interaction Authentication (ZIA) refers to approaches that authenticate a user to a verifier (terminal) without any user interaction. Currently deployed ZIA solutions are predominantly based on the terminal detecting the proximity of the user's personal device, or a security token, by running an authentication protocol over a short-range wireless communication channel. Unfortunately, this simple approach is highly vulnerable to low-cost and practical relay attacks which completely offset the usability benefits of ZIA. The use of contextual information, gathered via on-board sensors, to detect the co-presence of the user and the verifier is a recently proposed mechanism to resist relay attacks. In this paper, we systematically investigate the performance of different sensor modalities for co-presence detection with respect to a standard Dolev-Yao adversary. First, using a common data collection framework run in realistic everyday settings, we compare the performance of four commonly available sensor modalities (WiFi, Bluetooth, GPS, and Audio) in resisting ZIA relay attacks, and find that WiFi is better than the rest. Second, we show that, compared to any single modality, fusing multiple modalities improves resilience against ZIA relay attacks while retaining a high level of usability. Third, we motivate the need for a stronger adversarial model to characterize an attacker who can compromise the integrity of context sensing itself. We show that in the presence of such a powerful attacker, each individual sensor modality offers very low security. Positively, the use of multiple sensor modalities improves security against such an attacker if the attacker cannot compromise multiple modalities simultaneously.",
keywords = "Bluetooth, Global Positioning System, authorisation, computer network security, wireless LAN, Bluetooth modality, Dolev-Yao adversary, GPS modality, Global Positioning Systems, Wi-Fi modality, Wireless Fidelity, ZIA usability benefits, adversarial model, audio modality, authentication protocol, contextual information, data collection framework, relay attack resistance, security token, sensor modalities, short-range wireless communication channel, user authentication, user interaction, zero-interaction authentication, Context, IEEE 802.11 Standards, Performance evaluation, Relays, Sensors",
author = "Truong, {H. T. T.} and Xiang Gao and B. Shrestha and N. Saxena and N. Asokan and P. Nurmi",
year = "2014",
month = mar
day = "24",
doi = "10.1109/PerCom.2014.6813957",
language = "English",
pages = "163--171",
booktitle = "2014 IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications (PerCom)",
publisher = "IEEE",

}

RIS

TY - GEN

T1 - Comparing and fusing different sensor modalities for relay attack resistance in Zero-Interaction Authentication

AU - Truong, H. T. T.

AU - Gao, Xiang

AU - Shrestha, B.

AU - Saxena, N.

AU - Asokan, N.

AU - Nurmi, P.

PY - 2014/3/24

Y1 - 2014/3/24

N2 - Zero-Interaction Authentication (ZIA) refers to approaches that authenticate a user to a verifier (terminal) without any user interaction. Currently deployed ZIA solutions are predominantly based on the terminal detecting the proximity of the user's personal device, or a security token, by running an authentication protocol over a short-range wireless communication channel. Unfortunately, this simple approach is highly vulnerable to low-cost and practical relay attacks which completely offset the usability benefits of ZIA. The use of contextual information, gathered via on-board sensors, to detect the co-presence of the user and the verifier is a recently proposed mechanism to resist relay attacks. In this paper, we systematically investigate the performance of different sensor modalities for co-presence detection with respect to a standard Dolev-Yao adversary. First, using a common data collection framework run in realistic everyday settings, we compare the performance of four commonly available sensor modalities (WiFi, Bluetooth, GPS, and Audio) in resisting ZIA relay attacks, and find that WiFi is better than the rest. Second, we show that, compared to any single modality, fusing multiple modalities improves resilience against ZIA relay attacks while retaining a high level of usability. Third, we motivate the need for a stronger adversarial model to characterize an attacker who can compromise the integrity of context sensing itself. We show that in the presence of such a powerful attacker, each individual sensor modality offers very low security. Positively, the use of multiple sensor modalities improves security against such an attacker if the attacker cannot compromise multiple modalities simultaneously.

AB - Zero-Interaction Authentication (ZIA) refers to approaches that authenticate a user to a verifier (terminal) without any user interaction. Currently deployed ZIA solutions are predominantly based on the terminal detecting the proximity of the user's personal device, or a security token, by running an authentication protocol over a short-range wireless communication channel. Unfortunately, this simple approach is highly vulnerable to low-cost and practical relay attacks which completely offset the usability benefits of ZIA. The use of contextual information, gathered via on-board sensors, to detect the co-presence of the user and the verifier is a recently proposed mechanism to resist relay attacks. In this paper, we systematically investigate the performance of different sensor modalities for co-presence detection with respect to a standard Dolev-Yao adversary. First, using a common data collection framework run in realistic everyday settings, we compare the performance of four commonly available sensor modalities (WiFi, Bluetooth, GPS, and Audio) in resisting ZIA relay attacks, and find that WiFi is better than the rest. Second, we show that, compared to any single modality, fusing multiple modalities improves resilience against ZIA relay attacks while retaining a high level of usability. Third, we motivate the need for a stronger adversarial model to characterize an attacker who can compromise the integrity of context sensing itself. We show that in the presence of such a powerful attacker, each individual sensor modality offers very low security. Positively, the use of multiple sensor modalities improves security against such an attacker if the attacker cannot compromise multiple modalities simultaneously.

KW - Bluetooth

KW - Global Positioning System

KW - authorisation

KW - computer network security

KW - wireless LAN

KW - Bluetooth modality

KW - Dolev-Yao adversary

KW - GPS modality

KW - Global Positioning Systems

KW - Wi-Fi modality

KW - Wireless Fidelity

KW - ZIA usability benefits

KW - adversarial model

KW - audio modality

KW - authentication protocol

KW - contextual information

KW - data collection framework

KW - relay attack resistance

KW - security token

KW - sensor modalities

KW - short-range wireless communication channel

KW - user authentication

KW - user interaction

KW - zero-interaction authentication

KW - Context

KW - IEEE 802.11 Standards

KW - Performance evaluation

KW - Relays

KW - Sensors

U2 - 10.1109/PerCom.2014.6813957

DO - 10.1109/PerCom.2014.6813957

M3 - Conference contribution/Paper

SP - 163

EP - 171

BT - 2014 IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications (PerCom)

PB - IEEE

ER -