Home > Research > Publications & Outputs > Compensation Committees and CEO Compensation In...
View graph of relations

Compensation Committees and CEO Compensation Incentives in U.S. Entrepreneurial Firms

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal article

Published
<mark>Journal publication date</mark>12/2004
<mark>Journal</mark>Journal of Management Accounting Research
Issue number1
Volume16
Number of pages22
Pages (from-to)35-56
Publication statusPublished
Original languageEnglish

Abstract

This study uses a sample of IPO firms to investigate the relation between the compensation committee, CEO compensation, and CEO incentives. We investigate two theoretical models: the three‐tier optimal contracting model and the managerial power model. We find support for the three‐tier agency model. The presence of significant shareholders on the compensation committee (i.e., those with share stakes in excess of 5 percent) is associated with lower CEO pay and higher CEO equity incentives. Firms with higher paid compensation committee members are associated with greater CEO compensation and lower incentives. The managerial power model receives little support. We find no evidence that insiders or CEOs of other firms serving on the compensation committee raise the level of CEO pay or lower CEO incentives.