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Compensation Committees and CEO Compensation Incentives in U.S. Entrepreneurial Firms

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Compensation Committees and CEO Compensation Incentives in U.S. Entrepreneurial Firms. / Conyon, Martin; He, Lerong.
In: Journal of Management Accounting Research, Vol. 16, No. 1, 12.2004, p. 35-56.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Conyon, M & He, L 2004, 'Compensation Committees and CEO Compensation Incentives in U.S. Entrepreneurial Firms', Journal of Management Accounting Research, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 35-56. https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar.2004.16.1.35

APA

Conyon, M., & He, L. (2004). Compensation Committees and CEO Compensation Incentives in U.S. Entrepreneurial Firms. Journal of Management Accounting Research, 16(1), 35-56. https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar.2004.16.1.35

Vancouver

Conyon M, He L. Compensation Committees and CEO Compensation Incentives in U.S. Entrepreneurial Firms. Journal of Management Accounting Research. 2004 Dec;16(1):35-56. doi: 10.2308/jmar.2004.16.1.35

Author

Conyon, Martin ; He, Lerong. / Compensation Committees and CEO Compensation Incentives in U.S. Entrepreneurial Firms. In: Journal of Management Accounting Research. 2004 ; Vol. 16, No. 1. pp. 35-56.

Bibtex

@article{a1684c852434457f8a877410a447ec2e,
title = "Compensation Committees and CEO Compensation Incentives in U.S. Entrepreneurial Firms",
abstract = "This study uses a sample of IPO firms to investigate the relation between the compensation committee, CEO compensation, and CEO incentives. We investigate two theoretical models: the three‐tier optimal contracting model and the managerial power model. We find support for the three‐tier agency model. The presence of significant shareholders on the compensation committee (i.e., those with share stakes in excess of 5 percent) is associated with lower CEO pay and higher CEO equity incentives. Firms with higher paid compensation committee members are associated with greater CEO compensation and lower incentives. The managerial power model receives little support. We find no evidence that insiders or CEOs of other firms serving on the compensation committee raise the level of CEO pay or lower CEO incentives.",
author = "Martin Conyon and Lerong He",
year = "2004",
month = dec,
doi = "10.2308/jmar.2004.16.1.35",
language = "English",
volume = "16",
pages = "35--56",
journal = "Journal of Management Accounting Research",
issn = "1049-2127",
publisher = "American Accounting Association",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Compensation Committees and CEO Compensation Incentives in U.S. Entrepreneurial Firms

AU - Conyon, Martin

AU - He, Lerong

PY - 2004/12

Y1 - 2004/12

N2 - This study uses a sample of IPO firms to investigate the relation between the compensation committee, CEO compensation, and CEO incentives. We investigate two theoretical models: the three‐tier optimal contracting model and the managerial power model. We find support for the three‐tier agency model. The presence of significant shareholders on the compensation committee (i.e., those with share stakes in excess of 5 percent) is associated with lower CEO pay and higher CEO equity incentives. Firms with higher paid compensation committee members are associated with greater CEO compensation and lower incentives. The managerial power model receives little support. We find no evidence that insiders or CEOs of other firms serving on the compensation committee raise the level of CEO pay or lower CEO incentives.

AB - This study uses a sample of IPO firms to investigate the relation between the compensation committee, CEO compensation, and CEO incentives. We investigate two theoretical models: the three‐tier optimal contracting model and the managerial power model. We find support for the three‐tier agency model. The presence of significant shareholders on the compensation committee (i.e., those with share stakes in excess of 5 percent) is associated with lower CEO pay and higher CEO equity incentives. Firms with higher paid compensation committee members are associated with greater CEO compensation and lower incentives. The managerial power model receives little support. We find no evidence that insiders or CEOs of other firms serving on the compensation committee raise the level of CEO pay or lower CEO incentives.

U2 - 10.2308/jmar.2004.16.1.35

DO - 10.2308/jmar.2004.16.1.35

M3 - Journal article

VL - 16

SP - 35

EP - 56

JO - Journal of Management Accounting Research

JF - Journal of Management Accounting Research

SN - 1049-2127

IS - 1

ER -