Home > Research > Publications & Outputs > Controlling the executive in times of terrorism...
View graph of relations

Controlling the executive in times of terrorism : competing perspectives on effective oversight mechanisms.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Published

Standard

Controlling the executive in times of terrorism : competing perspectives on effective oversight mechanisms. / de Londras, Fiona; Davis, Feargal.
In: Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2010, p. 19-47.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

APA

Vancouver

de Londras F, Davis F. Controlling the executive in times of terrorism : competing perspectives on effective oversight mechanisms. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies. 2010;30(1):19-47. doi: 10.1093/ojls/gqp031

Author

de Londras, Fiona ; Davis, Feargal. / Controlling the executive in times of terrorism : competing perspectives on effective oversight mechanisms. In: Oxford Journal of Legal Studies. 2010 ; Vol. 30, No. 1. pp. 19-47.

Bibtex

@article{af39f793c0704ba09d9bc4badff4cb6d,
title = "Controlling the executive in times of terrorism : competing perspectives on effective oversight mechanisms.",
abstract = "The well-established pattern of Executive expansionism and limited oversight of Executive action in times of terrorism is problematic from the civil libertarian point of view. How to limit such action has been the subject of much scholarship, a large amount of which focuses on perceptions of institutional competence rather than effectiveness. For the authors the effective control of security-focused state action is to be judged by the extent to which it consists only of action that is necessary and proportionate and thereby strikes an appropriate balance between security exigencies and individual rights. This article, written and structured in dialectic form, presents competing perspectives on effective oversight mechanisms: on the one hand an extra-constitutionalism perspective, proposing a limited role for the Judiciary and emphasising the need for legislative and democratic controls; and on the other an argument for judicial muscularity.",
author = "{de Londras}, Fiona and Feargal Davis",
year = "2010",
doi = "10.1093/ojls/gqp031",
language = "English",
volume = "30",
pages = "19--47",
journal = "Oxford Journal of Legal Studies",
issn = "1464-3820",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Controlling the executive in times of terrorism : competing perspectives on effective oversight mechanisms.

AU - de Londras, Fiona

AU - Davis, Feargal

PY - 2010

Y1 - 2010

N2 - The well-established pattern of Executive expansionism and limited oversight of Executive action in times of terrorism is problematic from the civil libertarian point of view. How to limit such action has been the subject of much scholarship, a large amount of which focuses on perceptions of institutional competence rather than effectiveness. For the authors the effective control of security-focused state action is to be judged by the extent to which it consists only of action that is necessary and proportionate and thereby strikes an appropriate balance between security exigencies and individual rights. This article, written and structured in dialectic form, presents competing perspectives on effective oversight mechanisms: on the one hand an extra-constitutionalism perspective, proposing a limited role for the Judiciary and emphasising the need for legislative and democratic controls; and on the other an argument for judicial muscularity.

AB - The well-established pattern of Executive expansionism and limited oversight of Executive action in times of terrorism is problematic from the civil libertarian point of view. How to limit such action has been the subject of much scholarship, a large amount of which focuses on perceptions of institutional competence rather than effectiveness. For the authors the effective control of security-focused state action is to be judged by the extent to which it consists only of action that is necessary and proportionate and thereby strikes an appropriate balance between security exigencies and individual rights. This article, written and structured in dialectic form, presents competing perspectives on effective oversight mechanisms: on the one hand an extra-constitutionalism perspective, proposing a limited role for the Judiciary and emphasising the need for legislative and democratic controls; and on the other an argument for judicial muscularity.

U2 - 10.1093/ojls/gqp031

DO - 10.1093/ojls/gqp031

M3 - Journal article

VL - 30

SP - 19

EP - 47

JO - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies

JF - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies

SN - 1464-3820

IS - 1

ER -