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  • Corporate Crime

    Rights statement: © 2017 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston.

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Corporate Crime and Plea Bargains

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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Corporate Crime and Plea Bargains. / Procaccia, U.; Winter, E.
In: Law and Ethics of Human Rights, Vol. 11, No. 1, 05.2017, p. 119-133.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Procaccia, U & Winter, E 2017, 'Corporate Crime and Plea Bargains', Law and Ethics of Human Rights, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 119-133. https://doi.org/10.1515/lehr-2017-0004

APA

Procaccia, U., & Winter, E. (2017). Corporate Crime and Plea Bargains. Law and Ethics of Human Rights, 11(1), 119-133. https://doi.org/10.1515/lehr-2017-0004

Vancouver

Procaccia U, Winter E. Corporate Crime and Plea Bargains. Law and Ethics of Human Rights. 2017 May;11(1):119-133. Epub 2017 May 9. doi: 10.1515/lehr-2017-0004

Author

Procaccia, U. ; Winter, E. / Corporate Crime and Plea Bargains. In: Law and Ethics of Human Rights. 2017 ; Vol. 11, No. 1. pp. 119-133.

Bibtex

@article{7d4a57751f2a49ba9577cac538e57425,
title = "Corporate Crime and Plea Bargains",
abstract = "Corporate entities enjoy legal subjectivity in a variety of forms, but they are not human beings. Hence, their legal capacity to bear rights and obligations of their own is not universal. This article lays out a stylized model that explores, from a normative point of view, one of the limits that ought to be set on corporate capacity to act {"}as if{"} they had a human nature-the capacity to commit crime. Accepted wisdom states that corporate criminal liability is justified as a measure to deter criminal behavior. Our analysis supports this intuition in one subset of cases, but also reveals that deterrence might in fact be undermined in another subset of cases, especially in an environment saturated with plea bargains involving serious violations of the law. {\textcopyright} 2017 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston 2017.",
keywords = "corporate capacity, corporate criminal liability, criminal deterrence, stakeholders",
author = "U. Procaccia and E. Winter",
note = "{\textcopyright} 2017 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston.",
year = "2017",
month = may,
doi = "10.1515/lehr-2017-0004",
language = "English",
volume = "11",
pages = "119--133",
journal = "Law and Ethics of Human Rights",
issn = "1938-2545",
publisher = "Walter de Gruyter GmbH",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Corporate Crime and Plea Bargains

AU - Procaccia, U.

AU - Winter, E.

N1 - © 2017 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston.

PY - 2017/5

Y1 - 2017/5

N2 - Corporate entities enjoy legal subjectivity in a variety of forms, but they are not human beings. Hence, their legal capacity to bear rights and obligations of their own is not universal. This article lays out a stylized model that explores, from a normative point of view, one of the limits that ought to be set on corporate capacity to act "as if" they had a human nature-the capacity to commit crime. Accepted wisdom states that corporate criminal liability is justified as a measure to deter criminal behavior. Our analysis supports this intuition in one subset of cases, but also reveals that deterrence might in fact be undermined in another subset of cases, especially in an environment saturated with plea bargains involving serious violations of the law. © 2017 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston 2017.

AB - Corporate entities enjoy legal subjectivity in a variety of forms, but they are not human beings. Hence, their legal capacity to bear rights and obligations of their own is not universal. This article lays out a stylized model that explores, from a normative point of view, one of the limits that ought to be set on corporate capacity to act "as if" they had a human nature-the capacity to commit crime. Accepted wisdom states that corporate criminal liability is justified as a measure to deter criminal behavior. Our analysis supports this intuition in one subset of cases, but also reveals that deterrence might in fact be undermined in another subset of cases, especially in an environment saturated with plea bargains involving serious violations of the law. © 2017 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston 2017.

KW - corporate capacity

KW - corporate criminal liability

KW - criminal deterrence

KW - stakeholders

U2 - 10.1515/lehr-2017-0004

DO - 10.1515/lehr-2017-0004

M3 - Journal article

VL - 11

SP - 119

EP - 133

JO - Law and Ethics of Human Rights

JF - Law and Ethics of Human Rights

SN - 1938-2545

IS - 1

ER -