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Democratic peace and electoral accountability

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Democratic peace and electoral accountability. / Conconi, Paola; Sahuguet, Nicolas; Zanardi, Maurizio.

In: Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 12, No. 4, 08.2014, p. 997-1028.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal article

Harvard

Conconi, P, Sahuguet, N & Zanardi, M 2014, 'Democratic peace and electoral accountability', Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 997-1028. https://doi.org/10.1111/jeea.12074

APA

Conconi, P., Sahuguet, N., & Zanardi, M. (2014). Democratic peace and electoral accountability. Journal of the European Economic Association, 12(4), 997-1028. https://doi.org/10.1111/jeea.12074

Vancouver

Conconi P, Sahuguet N, Zanardi M. Democratic peace and electoral accountability. Journal of the European Economic Association. 2014 Aug;12(4):997-1028. https://doi.org/10.1111/jeea.12074

Author

Conconi, Paola ; Sahuguet, Nicolas ; Zanardi, Maurizio. / Democratic peace and electoral accountability. In: Journal of the European Economic Association. 2014 ; Vol. 12, No. 4. pp. 997-1028.

Bibtex

@article{d7feaf74e5244cb181188b07838e6a9c,
title = "Democratic peace and electoral accountability",
abstract = "Democracies rarely engage in conflicts with one another, though they are not averse to fighting autocracies. We exploit the existence in many countries of executive term limits to show that electoral accountability is the key reason behind this “democratic peace” phenomenon. We construct a new dataset of term limits for a sample of 177 countries over the 1816–2001 period, and combine this information with a large dataset of interstate conflicts. Our empirical analysis shows that, although democracies are significantly less likely to fight each other, democracies with leaders who face binding term limits are as conflict prone as autocracies. The study of electoral calendars confirms the importance of re-election incentives: in democracies with two-term limits, conflicts are less likely to occur during the executive{\textquoteright}s first mandate than in the last one. Our findings support the Kantian idea that elections act as a discipline device, deterring leaders from engaging in costly conflicts.",
author = "Paola Conconi and Nicolas Sahuguet and Maurizio Zanardi",
year = "2014",
month = aug
doi = "10.1111/jeea.12074",
language = "English",
volume = "12",
pages = "997--1028",
journal = "Journal of the European Economic Association",
issn = "1542-4766",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Democratic peace and electoral accountability

AU - Conconi, Paola

AU - Sahuguet, Nicolas

AU - Zanardi, Maurizio

PY - 2014/8

Y1 - 2014/8

N2 - Democracies rarely engage in conflicts with one another, though they are not averse to fighting autocracies. We exploit the existence in many countries of executive term limits to show that electoral accountability is the key reason behind this “democratic peace” phenomenon. We construct a new dataset of term limits for a sample of 177 countries over the 1816–2001 period, and combine this information with a large dataset of interstate conflicts. Our empirical analysis shows that, although democracies are significantly less likely to fight each other, democracies with leaders who face binding term limits are as conflict prone as autocracies. The study of electoral calendars confirms the importance of re-election incentives: in democracies with two-term limits, conflicts are less likely to occur during the executive’s first mandate than in the last one. Our findings support the Kantian idea that elections act as a discipline device, deterring leaders from engaging in costly conflicts.

AB - Democracies rarely engage in conflicts with one another, though they are not averse to fighting autocracies. We exploit the existence in many countries of executive term limits to show that electoral accountability is the key reason behind this “democratic peace” phenomenon. We construct a new dataset of term limits for a sample of 177 countries over the 1816–2001 period, and combine this information with a large dataset of interstate conflicts. Our empirical analysis shows that, although democracies are significantly less likely to fight each other, democracies with leaders who face binding term limits are as conflict prone as autocracies. The study of electoral calendars confirms the importance of re-election incentives: in democracies with two-term limits, conflicts are less likely to occur during the executive’s first mandate than in the last one. Our findings support the Kantian idea that elections act as a discipline device, deterring leaders from engaging in costly conflicts.

U2 - 10.1111/jeea.12074

DO - 10.1111/jeea.12074

M3 - Journal article

VL - 12

SP - 997

EP - 1028

JO - Journal of the European Economic Association

JF - Journal of the European Economic Association

SN - 1542-4766

IS - 4

ER -