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  • DDEMOS

    Rights statement: This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Computers and Security. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Computers and Security, 83, 2019 DOI: 10.1016/j.cose.2019.03.001

    Accepted author manuscript, 1.8 MB, PDF document

    Available under license: CC BY-NC-ND

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Distributed, end-to-end verifiable, and privacy-preserving internet voting systems

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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  • N. Chondros
  • B. Zhang
  • T. Zacharias
  • P. Diamantopoulos
  • S. Maneas
  • C. Patsonakis
  • A. Delis
  • A. Kiayias
  • M. Roussopoulos
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<mark>Journal publication date</mark>1/06/2019
<mark>Journal</mark>Computers and Security
Volume83
Number of pages32
Pages (from-to)268-299
Publication StatusPublished
Early online date6/03/19
<mark>Original language</mark>English

Abstract

We present the D-DEMOS suite of distributed, privacy-preserving, and end-to-end verifiable e-voting systems; one completely asynchronous and one with minimal timing assumptions but better performance. Their distributed voting operation is human verifiable; a voter can vote over the web, using an unsafe web client stack, without sacrificing her privacy, and get recorded-as-cast assurance. Additionally, a voter can outsource election auditing to third parties, still without sacrificing privacy. We provide a model and security analysis of the systems, implement prototypes of the complete systems, measure their performance experimentally, demonstrate their ability to handle large-scale elections, and demonstrate the performance trade-offs between the two versions.

Bibliographic note

This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Computers and Security. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Computers and Security, 83, 2019 DOI: 10.1016/j.cose.2019.03.001