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Do salaries improve worker performance?

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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Do salaries improve worker performance? / Bryson, Alex; Buraimo, Babatunde; Simmons, Robert.
In: Labour Economics, Vol. 18, No. 4, 08.2011, p. 424-433.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Bryson, A, Buraimo, B & Simmons, R 2011, 'Do salaries improve worker performance?', Labour Economics, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 424-433. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2010.12.005

APA

Bryson, A., Buraimo, B., & Simmons, R. (2011). Do salaries improve worker performance? Labour Economics, 18(4), 424-433. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2010.12.005

Vancouver

Bryson A, Buraimo B, Simmons R. Do salaries improve worker performance? Labour Economics. 2011 Aug;18(4):424-433. doi: 10.1016/j.labeco.2010.12.005

Author

Bryson, Alex ; Buraimo, Babatunde ; Simmons, Robert. / Do salaries improve worker performance?. In: Labour Economics. 2011 ; Vol. 18, No. 4. pp. 424-433.

Bibtex

@article{3a753990e47647288268dfa600ebe7bb,
title = "Do salaries improve worker performance?",
abstract = "We establish the effects of salaries on worker performance by exploiting a natural experiment in which some workers in a particular occupation (football referees) switch from short-term contracts to salaried contracts. Worker performance improves among those who move onto salaried contracts relative to those who do not. The finding is robust to the introduction of worker fixed effects indicating that it is not driven by better workers being awarded salary contracts. Nor is it sensitive to workers sorting into or out of the profession. Improved performance could arise from the additional effort workers exert due to career concerns, the higher income associated with career contracts (an efficiency wage effect) or improvements in worker quality arising from off-the-job training which accompanies the salaried contracts.",
keywords = "Incentives, Salaries, Productivity, Sports",
author = "Alex Bryson and Babatunde Buraimo and Robert Simmons",
year = "2011",
month = aug,
doi = "10.1016/j.labeco.2010.12.005",
language = "English",
volume = "18",
pages = "424--433",
journal = "Labour Economics",
issn = "0927-5371",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Do salaries improve worker performance?

AU - Bryson, Alex

AU - Buraimo, Babatunde

AU - Simmons, Robert

PY - 2011/8

Y1 - 2011/8

N2 - We establish the effects of salaries on worker performance by exploiting a natural experiment in which some workers in a particular occupation (football referees) switch from short-term contracts to salaried contracts. Worker performance improves among those who move onto salaried contracts relative to those who do not. The finding is robust to the introduction of worker fixed effects indicating that it is not driven by better workers being awarded salary contracts. Nor is it sensitive to workers sorting into or out of the profession. Improved performance could arise from the additional effort workers exert due to career concerns, the higher income associated with career contracts (an efficiency wage effect) or improvements in worker quality arising from off-the-job training which accompanies the salaried contracts.

AB - We establish the effects of salaries on worker performance by exploiting a natural experiment in which some workers in a particular occupation (football referees) switch from short-term contracts to salaried contracts. Worker performance improves among those who move onto salaried contracts relative to those who do not. The finding is robust to the introduction of worker fixed effects indicating that it is not driven by better workers being awarded salary contracts. Nor is it sensitive to workers sorting into or out of the profession. Improved performance could arise from the additional effort workers exert due to career concerns, the higher income associated with career contracts (an efficiency wage effect) or improvements in worker quality arising from off-the-job training which accompanies the salaried contracts.

KW - Incentives

KW - Salaries

KW - Productivity

KW - Sports

U2 - 10.1016/j.labeco.2010.12.005

DO - 10.1016/j.labeco.2010.12.005

M3 - Journal article

VL - 18

SP - 424

EP - 433

JO - Labour Economics

JF - Labour Economics

SN - 0927-5371

IS - 4

ER -