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Do Salaries Improve Worker Performance?

Research output: Working paper

Published

Standard

Do Salaries Improve Worker Performance? / Bryson, A; Buraimo, B; Simmons, R.
Lancaster University: The Department of Economics, 2010. (Economics Working Paper Series).

Research output: Working paper

Harvard

Bryson, A, Buraimo, B & Simmons, R 2010 'Do Salaries Improve Worker Performance?' Economics Working Paper Series, The Department of Economics, Lancaster University.

APA

Bryson, A., Buraimo, B., & Simmons, R. (2010). Do Salaries Improve Worker Performance? (Economics Working Paper Series). The Department of Economics.

Vancouver

Bryson A, Buraimo B, Simmons R. Do Salaries Improve Worker Performance? Lancaster University: The Department of Economics. 2010. (Economics Working Paper Series).

Author

Bryson, A ; Buraimo, B ; Simmons, R. / Do Salaries Improve Worker Performance?. Lancaster University : The Department of Economics, 2010. (Economics Working Paper Series).

Bibtex

@techreport{99975438b14e456c8a35885feb7d1b2f,
title = "Do Salaries Improve Worker Performance?",
abstract = "We establish the effects of salaries on worker performance by exploiting a natural experiment in which some workers in a particular occupation (football referees) switch from short-term contracts to salaried contracts. Worker performance improves among those who move onto salaried contracts relative to those who do not. The finding is robust to the introduction of worker fixed effects indicating that it is not driven by better workers being awarded salary contracts. Nor is it sensitive to workers sorting into or out of the profession. Improved performance could arise from the additional effort workers exert due to career concerns, the higher income associated with career contracts (an efficiency wage effect) or improvements in worker quality arising from off-the-job training which accompanies the salaried contracts.",
keywords = "incentives, salaries, productivity, sports",
author = "A Bryson and B Buraimo and R Simmons",
year = "2010",
language = "English",
series = "Economics Working Paper Series",
publisher = "The Department of Economics",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "The Department of Economics",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Do Salaries Improve Worker Performance?

AU - Bryson, A

AU - Buraimo, B

AU - Simmons, R

PY - 2010

Y1 - 2010

N2 - We establish the effects of salaries on worker performance by exploiting a natural experiment in which some workers in a particular occupation (football referees) switch from short-term contracts to salaried contracts. Worker performance improves among those who move onto salaried contracts relative to those who do not. The finding is robust to the introduction of worker fixed effects indicating that it is not driven by better workers being awarded salary contracts. Nor is it sensitive to workers sorting into or out of the profession. Improved performance could arise from the additional effort workers exert due to career concerns, the higher income associated with career contracts (an efficiency wage effect) or improvements in worker quality arising from off-the-job training which accompanies the salaried contracts.

AB - We establish the effects of salaries on worker performance by exploiting a natural experiment in which some workers in a particular occupation (football referees) switch from short-term contracts to salaried contracts. Worker performance improves among those who move onto salaried contracts relative to those who do not. The finding is robust to the introduction of worker fixed effects indicating that it is not driven by better workers being awarded salary contracts. Nor is it sensitive to workers sorting into or out of the profession. Improved performance could arise from the additional effort workers exert due to career concerns, the higher income associated with career contracts (an efficiency wage effect) or improvements in worker quality arising from off-the-job training which accompanies the salaried contracts.

KW - incentives

KW - salaries

KW - productivity

KW - sports

M3 - Working paper

T3 - Economics Working Paper Series

BT - Do Salaries Improve Worker Performance?

PB - The Department of Economics

CY - Lancaster University

ER -