TY - UNPB

T1 - Does analyst ranking affect how informative target prices are to institutional investors?

AU - Hashim, Noor

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - Evidence shows that market participants value analysts’ target prices. There is limited evidence, however, on how target price revisions influence investors’ decisions. I examine whether analyst ranking status affects institutional investors’ decisions to incorporate target price information into their investment strategies. This examination is relevant to the economic question: Does analyst reputation mitigate or exacerbate the conflicts of interest that analysts face? Consistent with institutional investor trades being based on superior information, I observe differences in the information content of target price revisions by star and non-star analysts. Additionally, a duration analysis shows that low target price quality significantly increases the hazard of institutional investors not voting analysts as ‘stars’.

AB - Evidence shows that market participants value analysts’ target prices. There is limited evidence, however, on how target price revisions influence investors’ decisions. I examine whether analyst ranking status affects institutional investors’ decisions to incorporate target price information into their investment strategies. This examination is relevant to the economic question: Does analyst reputation mitigate or exacerbate the conflicts of interest that analysts face? Consistent with institutional investor trades being based on superior information, I observe differences in the information content of target price revisions by star and non-star analysts. Additionally, a duration analysis shows that low target price quality significantly increases the hazard of institutional investors not voting analysts as ‘stars’.

M3 - Working paper

BT - Does analyst ranking affect how informative target prices are to institutional investors?

PB - The Department of Accounting and Finance

CY - Lancaster

ER -