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Does it pay to have friends? Social ties and executive appointments in banking

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal article

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Does it pay to have friends? Social ties and executive appointments in banking. / Berger, Allen N.; Kick, Thomas; Koetter, Michael; Schaeck, Klaus.

In: Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 37, No. 6, 01.06.2013, p. 2087-2105.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal article

Harvard

Berger, AN, Kick, T, Koetter, M & Schaeck, K 2013, 'Does it pay to have friends? Social ties and executive appointments in banking', Journal of Banking and Finance, vol. 37, no. 6, pp. 2087-2105. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.01.040

APA

Berger, A. N., Kick, T., Koetter, M., & Schaeck, K. (2013). Does it pay to have friends? Social ties and executive appointments in banking. Journal of Banking and Finance, 37(6), 2087-2105. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.01.040

Vancouver

Berger AN, Kick T, Koetter M, Schaeck K. Does it pay to have friends? Social ties and executive appointments in banking. Journal of Banking and Finance. 2013 Jun 1;37(6):2087-2105. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.01.040

Author

Berger, Allen N. ; Kick, Thomas ; Koetter, Michael ; Schaeck, Klaus. / Does it pay to have friends? Social ties and executive appointments in banking. In: Journal of Banking and Finance. 2013 ; Vol. 37, No. 6. pp. 2087-2105.

Bibtex

@article{6da1e8b397fe418e856cc5762c5396ba,
title = "Does it pay to have friends? Social ties and executive appointments in banking",
abstract = "We exploit a unique sample to analyze how homophily (affinity for similar others) and social ties affect career outcomes in banking. We test if these factors increase the probability that the appointee to an executive board is an outsider without previous employment at the bank compared to being an insider. Homophily based on age and gender increase the chances of the outsider appointments. Similar educational backgrounds, in contrast, reduce the chance that the appointee is an outsider. Greater social ties also increase the probability of an outside appointment. Results from a duration model show that larger age differences shorten tenure significantly, whereas gender similarities barely affect tenure. Differences in educational backgrounds affect tenure differently across the banking sectors. Maintaining more contacts to the executive board reduces tenure. We also find weak evidence that social ties are associated with reduced profitability, consistent with cronyism in banking.",
keywords = "social networks, Executive careers, banking, corporate governace",
author = "Berger, {Allen N.} and Thomas Kick and Michael Koetter and Klaus Schaeck",
note = "Date of Acceptance: 23/01/2013",
year = "2013",
month = jun
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.01.040",
language = "English",
volume = "37",
pages = "2087--2105",
journal = "Journal of Banking and Finance",
issn = "0378-4266",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "6",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Does it pay to have friends? Social ties and executive appointments in banking

AU - Berger, Allen N.

AU - Kick, Thomas

AU - Koetter, Michael

AU - Schaeck, Klaus

N1 - Date of Acceptance: 23/01/2013

PY - 2013/6/1

Y1 - 2013/6/1

N2 - We exploit a unique sample to analyze how homophily (affinity for similar others) and social ties affect career outcomes in banking. We test if these factors increase the probability that the appointee to an executive board is an outsider without previous employment at the bank compared to being an insider. Homophily based on age and gender increase the chances of the outsider appointments. Similar educational backgrounds, in contrast, reduce the chance that the appointee is an outsider. Greater social ties also increase the probability of an outside appointment. Results from a duration model show that larger age differences shorten tenure significantly, whereas gender similarities barely affect tenure. Differences in educational backgrounds affect tenure differently across the banking sectors. Maintaining more contacts to the executive board reduces tenure. We also find weak evidence that social ties are associated with reduced profitability, consistent with cronyism in banking.

AB - We exploit a unique sample to analyze how homophily (affinity for similar others) and social ties affect career outcomes in banking. We test if these factors increase the probability that the appointee to an executive board is an outsider without previous employment at the bank compared to being an insider. Homophily based on age and gender increase the chances of the outsider appointments. Similar educational backgrounds, in contrast, reduce the chance that the appointee is an outsider. Greater social ties also increase the probability of an outside appointment. Results from a duration model show that larger age differences shorten tenure significantly, whereas gender similarities barely affect tenure. Differences in educational backgrounds affect tenure differently across the banking sectors. Maintaining more contacts to the executive board reduces tenure. We also find weak evidence that social ties are associated with reduced profitability, consistent with cronyism in banking.

KW - social networks

KW - Executive careers

KW - banking

KW - corporate governace

U2 - 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.01.040

DO - 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.01.040

M3 - Journal article

VL - 37

SP - 2087

EP - 2105

JO - Journal of Banking and Finance

JF - Journal of Banking and Finance

SN - 0378-4266

IS - 6

ER -