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    Rights statement: This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Homroy, S. (2015), Does Threat of Dismissal Constrain Acquisition Premium in CEO Pay?. Economica. doi: 10.1111/ecca.12163 which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecca.12163/abstract This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.

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Does threat of dismissal constrain acquisition premium in CEO pay

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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Does threat of dismissal constrain acquisition premium in CEO pay. / Homroy, Swarnodeep.
In: Economica, Vol. 82, No. Suppl. 1, 31.12.2015, p. 1349-1371.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Homroy, S 2015, 'Does threat of dismissal constrain acquisition premium in CEO pay', Economica, vol. 82, no. Suppl. 1, pp. 1349-1371. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecca.12163

APA

Homroy, S. (2015). Does threat of dismissal constrain acquisition premium in CEO pay. Economica, 82(Suppl. 1), 1349-1371. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecca.12163

Vancouver

Homroy S. Does threat of dismissal constrain acquisition premium in CEO pay. Economica. 2015 Dec 31;82(Suppl. 1):1349-1371. Epub 2015 Sept 18. doi: 10.1111/ecca.12163

Author

Homroy, Swarnodeep. / Does threat of dismissal constrain acquisition premium in CEO pay. In: Economica. 2015 ; Vol. 82, No. Suppl. 1. pp. 1349-1371.

Bibtex

@article{29048c299f9b44688b95698473b26db7,
title = "Does threat of dismissal constrain acquisition premium in CEO pay",
abstract = "This paper shows that the likelihood of post-acquisition CEO turnover can act as a constraint on risky acquisition decisions. The acquisition premium in pay decreases by over 50% if the dismissal risk is controlled for. Given a smaller pay premium for undertaking acquisitions and a non-zero risk of dismissal, shareholders are shown to be able to exercise some control over managerial incentives to engage in risky acquisitions through the mechanism for dismissal.",
author = "Swarnodeep Homroy",
note = "This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Homroy, S. (2015), Does Threat of Dismissal Constrain Acquisition Premium in CEO Pay?. Economica. doi: 10.1111/ecca.12163 which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecca.12163/abstract This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.",
year = "2015",
month = dec,
day = "31",
doi = "10.1111/ecca.12163",
language = "English",
volume = "82",
pages = "1349--1371",
journal = "Economica",
issn = "0013-0427",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "Suppl. 1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Does threat of dismissal constrain acquisition premium in CEO pay

AU - Homroy, Swarnodeep

N1 - This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Homroy, S. (2015), Does Threat of Dismissal Constrain Acquisition Premium in CEO Pay?. Economica. doi: 10.1111/ecca.12163 which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecca.12163/abstract This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.

PY - 2015/12/31

Y1 - 2015/12/31

N2 - This paper shows that the likelihood of post-acquisition CEO turnover can act as a constraint on risky acquisition decisions. The acquisition premium in pay decreases by over 50% if the dismissal risk is controlled for. Given a smaller pay premium for undertaking acquisitions and a non-zero risk of dismissal, shareholders are shown to be able to exercise some control over managerial incentives to engage in risky acquisitions through the mechanism for dismissal.

AB - This paper shows that the likelihood of post-acquisition CEO turnover can act as a constraint on risky acquisition decisions. The acquisition premium in pay decreases by over 50% if the dismissal risk is controlled for. Given a smaller pay premium for undertaking acquisitions and a non-zero risk of dismissal, shareholders are shown to be able to exercise some control over managerial incentives to engage in risky acquisitions through the mechanism for dismissal.

U2 - 10.1111/ecca.12163

DO - 10.1111/ecca.12163

M3 - Journal article

VL - 82

SP - 1349

EP - 1371

JO - Economica

JF - Economica

SN - 0013-0427

IS - Suppl. 1

ER -