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  • Meert Wang Samson 2017

    Rights statement: This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Cognition. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Cognition, 168, 2017 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2017.06.012

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Efficient belief tracking in adults: The role of task instruction, low-level associative processes and dispositional social functioning

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Efficient belief tracking in adults: The role of task instruction, low-level associative processes and dispositional social functioning. / Meert, Gaëlle; Wang, Jen Jessica; Samson, Dana.
In: Cognition, Vol. 168, 11.2017, p. 91-98.

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Meert G, Wang JJ, Samson D. Efficient belief tracking in adults: The role of task instruction, low-level associative processes and dispositional social functioning. Cognition. 2017 Nov;168:91-98. Epub 2017 Jun 27. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2017.06.012

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@article{45f7cae63ef94b2db533344b99948880,
title = "Efficient belief tracking in adults: The role of task instruction, low-level associative processes and dispositional social functioning",
abstract = "A growing body of evidence suggests that adults can monitor other people{\textquoteright}s beliefs in an efficient way. However, the nature and the limits of efficient belief tracking are still being debated. The present study addressed these issues by testing (a) whether adults spontaneously process other people{\textquoteright}s beliefs when overt task instructions assign priority to participants{\textquoteright} own belief, (b) whether this processing relies on low-level associative processes and (c) whether the propensity to track other people{\textquoteright}s beliefs is linked to empathic disposition. Adult participants were asked to alternately judge an agent{\textquoteright}s belief and their own belief. These beliefs were either consistent or inconsistent with each other. Furthermore, visual association between the agent and the object at which he was looking was either possible or impeded. Results showed interference from the agent{\textquoteright}s belief when participants judged their own belief, even when low-level associations were impeded. This indicates that adults still process other people{\textquoteright}s beliefs when priority is given to their own belief at the time of computation, and that this processing does not depend on low-level associative processes. Finally, performance on the belief task was associated with the Empathy Quotient and the Perspective Taking scale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index, indicating that efficient belief processing is linked to a dispositional dimension of social functioning.",
keywords = "Social cognition, Mentalising, Belief, Self vs. other, Low-level associative processes, Empathy",
author = "Ga{\"e}lle Meert and Wang, {Jen Jessica} and Dana Samson",
note = "This is the author{\textquoteright}s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Cognition. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Cognition, 168, 2017 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2017.06.012",
year = "2017",
month = nov,
doi = "10.1016/j.cognition.2017.06.012",
language = "English",
volume = "168",
pages = "91--98",
journal = "Cognition",
issn = "0010-0277",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Efficient belief tracking in adults

T2 - The role of task instruction, low-level associative processes and dispositional social functioning

AU - Meert, Gaëlle

AU - Wang, Jen Jessica

AU - Samson, Dana

N1 - This is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in Cognition. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Cognition, 168, 2017 DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2017.06.012

PY - 2017/11

Y1 - 2017/11

N2 - A growing body of evidence suggests that adults can monitor other people’s beliefs in an efficient way. However, the nature and the limits of efficient belief tracking are still being debated. The present study addressed these issues by testing (a) whether adults spontaneously process other people’s beliefs when overt task instructions assign priority to participants’ own belief, (b) whether this processing relies on low-level associative processes and (c) whether the propensity to track other people’s beliefs is linked to empathic disposition. Adult participants were asked to alternately judge an agent’s belief and their own belief. These beliefs were either consistent or inconsistent with each other. Furthermore, visual association between the agent and the object at which he was looking was either possible or impeded. Results showed interference from the agent’s belief when participants judged their own belief, even when low-level associations were impeded. This indicates that adults still process other people’s beliefs when priority is given to their own belief at the time of computation, and that this processing does not depend on low-level associative processes. Finally, performance on the belief task was associated with the Empathy Quotient and the Perspective Taking scale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index, indicating that efficient belief processing is linked to a dispositional dimension of social functioning.

AB - A growing body of evidence suggests that adults can monitor other people’s beliefs in an efficient way. However, the nature and the limits of efficient belief tracking are still being debated. The present study addressed these issues by testing (a) whether adults spontaneously process other people’s beliefs when overt task instructions assign priority to participants’ own belief, (b) whether this processing relies on low-level associative processes and (c) whether the propensity to track other people’s beliefs is linked to empathic disposition. Adult participants were asked to alternately judge an agent’s belief and their own belief. These beliefs were either consistent or inconsistent with each other. Furthermore, visual association between the agent and the object at which he was looking was either possible or impeded. Results showed interference from the agent’s belief when participants judged their own belief, even when low-level associations were impeded. This indicates that adults still process other people’s beliefs when priority is given to their own belief at the time of computation, and that this processing does not depend on low-level associative processes. Finally, performance on the belief task was associated with the Empathy Quotient and the Perspective Taking scale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index, indicating that efficient belief processing is linked to a dispositional dimension of social functioning.

KW - Social cognition

KW - Mentalising

KW - Belief

KW - Self vs. other

KW - Low-level associative processes

KW - Empathy

U2 - 10.1016/j.cognition.2017.06.012

DO - 10.1016/j.cognition.2017.06.012

M3 - Journal article

VL - 168

SP - 91

EP - 98

JO - Cognition

JF - Cognition

SN - 0010-0277

ER -