Home > Research > Publications & Outputs > Electoral competition with primaries and qualit...

Electronic data

  • accepteddraft

    Rights statement: © 2018 by the Southern Political Science Association. All rights reserved.

    Accepted author manuscript, 683 KB, PDF document

    Available under license: CC BY-NC: Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License

Links

Text available via DOI:

View graph of relations

Electoral competition with primaries and quality asymmetries

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal article

Published
Close
<mark>Journal publication date</mark>01/2019
<mark>Journal</mark>Journal of Politics
Issue number1
Volume81
Number of pages14
Pages (from-to)260-273
Publication statusPublished
Early online date7/11/18
Original languageEnglish

Abstract

In two-dimensional two-party electoral competition under plurality rule, there are typically no equilibria, even when one of the dimensions refers to valence. The good news is that the introduction of either closed or open primaries acts as a stabilizing force since equilibria exist quite generally, serves as an arena for policy debates since all candidates propose differentiated platforms, and guarantees that each party's nominee is of higher quality than its primary opponent. Moreover, primaries tend to benefit the party whose median voter is closer to the overall median. The bad news is that the winner of the general election need not be the candidate with the highest overall quality since too competitive primaries can prove harmful. Given the differences between open and closed primaries, we show that the choice of primary type is particularly important and may determine the winner of the general election.

Bibliographic note

© 2018 by the Southern Political Science Association. All rights reserved.