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Electoral motives, partisan motives and dynamic optimality with many taxes: an international investigation

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<mark>Journal publication date</mark>02/2009
<mark>Journal</mark>Scottish Journal of Political Economy
Issue number1
Volume56
Number of pages20
Pages (from-to)94-113
Publication StatusPublished
<mark>Original language</mark>English

Abstract

In this paper, we argue that tax-smoothing results based on total tax revenues may be of limited importance if in fact governments are concerned with the inter-temporal distortionary effects of many kinds of taxes, when electoral and partisan motives also have to be taken into account. We develop an inter-temporal model that predicts that tax revenue mix should follow random walks. The model is tested with international data using both time series and panel-based unit root tests. We find that during the examined period, 1973-2003, governments are not optimizing tax components in the sense of Barro.