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Employment protection, threat and incentive effects on worker absence

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Employment protection, threat and incentive effects on worker absence. / Bradley, Steve; Green, Colin; Leeves, Gareth.
In: British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 52, No. 2, 06.2014, p. 333-358.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article

Harvard

Bradley, S, Green, C & Leeves, G 2014, 'Employment protection, threat and incentive effects on worker absence', British Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 333-358. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8543.2012.00916.x

APA

Bradley, S., Green, C., & Leeves, G. (2014). Employment protection, threat and incentive effects on worker absence. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 52(2), 333-358. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8543.2012.00916.x

Vancouver

Bradley S, Green C, Leeves G. Employment protection, threat and incentive effects on worker absence. British Journal of Industrial Relations. 2014 Jun;52(2):333-358. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8543.2012.00916.x

Author

Bradley, Steve ; Green, Colin ; Leeves, Gareth. / Employment protection, threat and incentive effects on worker absence. In: British Journal of Industrial Relations. 2014 ; Vol. 52, No. 2. pp. 333-358.

Bibtex

@article{36f71341dcf14b9f9df42b51013ab202,
title = "Employment protection, threat and incentive effects on worker absence",
abstract = "This article provides new evidence on the effect of changes in employment protection on worker absence. We use novel multi-organization data to examine changes in worker absence as workers move from temporary to permanent employment contracts. We demonstrate a robust positive effect of employment protection on sickness absence. It has also been suggested that the impact of employment protection on absence and effort is due to a fear of dismissal. We also provide evidence that suggests that temporary workers' absence is influenced by incentives to attain jobs with protection that is unrelated to threat of dismissal. This has not been considered in earlier research. This channel of employment protection effects has important policy implications.",
author = "Steve Bradley and Colin Green and Gareth Leeves",
year = "2014",
month = jun,
doi = "10.1111/j.1467-8543.2012.00916.x",
language = "English",
volume = "52",
pages = "333--358",
journal = "British Journal of Industrial Relations",
issn = "0007-1080",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Employment protection, threat and incentive effects on worker absence

AU - Bradley, Steve

AU - Green, Colin

AU - Leeves, Gareth

PY - 2014/6

Y1 - 2014/6

N2 - This article provides new evidence on the effect of changes in employment protection on worker absence. We use novel multi-organization data to examine changes in worker absence as workers move from temporary to permanent employment contracts. We demonstrate a robust positive effect of employment protection on sickness absence. It has also been suggested that the impact of employment protection on absence and effort is due to a fear of dismissal. We also provide evidence that suggests that temporary workers' absence is influenced by incentives to attain jobs with protection that is unrelated to threat of dismissal. This has not been considered in earlier research. This channel of employment protection effects has important policy implications.

AB - This article provides new evidence on the effect of changes in employment protection on worker absence. We use novel multi-organization data to examine changes in worker absence as workers move from temporary to permanent employment contracts. We demonstrate a robust positive effect of employment protection on sickness absence. It has also been suggested that the impact of employment protection on absence and effort is due to a fear of dismissal. We also provide evidence that suggests that temporary workers' absence is influenced by incentives to attain jobs with protection that is unrelated to threat of dismissal. This has not been considered in earlier research. This channel of employment protection effects has important policy implications.

U2 - 10.1111/j.1467-8543.2012.00916.x

DO - 10.1111/j.1467-8543.2012.00916.x

M3 - Journal article

VL - 52

SP - 333

EP - 358

JO - British Journal of Industrial Relations

JF - British Journal of Industrial Relations

SN - 0007-1080

IS - 2

ER -