Home > Research > Publications & Outputs > Equilibrium Design by Coarse Correlation in Qua...

Research

Associated organisational units

Electronic data

Keywords

View graph of relations

Equilibrium Design by Coarse Correlation in Quadratic Games

Research output: Working paper

Published

Standard

Equilibrium Design by Coarse Correlation in Quadratic Games. / Dokka Venkata Satyanaraya, Trivikram; Moulin, Herve; Ray, Indrajit et al.
Lancaster : Lancaster University, Department of Economics, 2020. (Economics Working Papers Series).

Research output: Working paper

Harvard

Dokka Venkata Satyanaraya, T, Moulin, H, Ray, I & Sen Gupta, S 2020 'Equilibrium Design by Coarse Correlation in Quadratic Games' Economics Working Papers Series, Lancaster University, Department of Economics, Lancaster .

APA

Dokka Venkata Satyanaraya, T., Moulin, H., Ray, I., & Sen Gupta, S. (2020). Equilibrium Design by Coarse Correlation in Quadratic Games. (Economics Working Papers Series). Lancaster University, Department of Economics.

Vancouver

Dokka Venkata Satyanaraya T, Moulin H, Ray I, Sen Gupta S. Equilibrium Design by Coarse Correlation in Quadratic Games. Lancaster : Lancaster University, Department of Economics. 2020 Jul 31. (Economics Working Papers Series).

Author

Dokka Venkata Satyanaraya, Trivikram ; Moulin, Herve ; Ray, Indrajit et al. / Equilibrium Design by Coarse Correlation in Quadratic Games. Lancaster : Lancaster University, Department of Economics, 2020. (Economics Working Papers Series).

Bibtex

@techreport{2e337643ab3e4406a528ac8f6cdd497c,
title = "Equilibrium Design by Coarse Correlation in Quadratic Games",
abstract = "In a public good provision or a public bad abatement situation, the non-cooperative interplay of the participants typically results in low levels of provision or abatement. In the familiar class of n-person quadratic games, we show that Coarse Correlated equilibria (CCEs) - simple mediated communication devices that do not alter the strategic structure of the game - can significantly outperform the Nash equilibrium in terms of the policy objective above.",
keywords = "Quadratic game, Coarse correlated equilibrium, Abatement level, Efficiency gain",
author = "{Dokka Venkata Satyanaraya}, Trivikram and Herve Moulin and Indrajit Ray and {Sen Gupta}, Sonali",
year = "2020",
month = jul,
day = "31",
language = "English",
series = "Economics Working Papers Series",
publisher = "Lancaster University, Department of Economics",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Lancaster University, Department of Economics",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Equilibrium Design by Coarse Correlation in Quadratic Games

AU - Dokka Venkata Satyanaraya, Trivikram

AU - Moulin, Herve

AU - Ray, Indrajit

AU - Sen Gupta, Sonali

PY - 2020/7/31

Y1 - 2020/7/31

N2 - In a public good provision or a public bad abatement situation, the non-cooperative interplay of the participants typically results in low levels of provision or abatement. In the familiar class of n-person quadratic games, we show that Coarse Correlated equilibria (CCEs) - simple mediated communication devices that do not alter the strategic structure of the game - can significantly outperform the Nash equilibrium in terms of the policy objective above.

AB - In a public good provision or a public bad abatement situation, the non-cooperative interplay of the participants typically results in low levels of provision or abatement. In the familiar class of n-person quadratic games, we show that Coarse Correlated equilibria (CCEs) - simple mediated communication devices that do not alter the strategic structure of the game - can significantly outperform the Nash equilibrium in terms of the policy objective above.

KW - Quadratic game

KW - Coarse correlated equilibrium

KW - Abatement level

KW - Efficiency gain

M3 - Working paper

T3 - Economics Working Papers Series

BT - Equilibrium Design by Coarse Correlation in Quadratic Games

PB - Lancaster University, Department of Economics

CY - Lancaster

ER -