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Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in China

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in China. / Conyon, Martin; He, Lerong.
In: Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2011, p. 1158-1175.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Conyon, M & He, L 2011, 'Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in China', Journal of Corporate Finance, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 1158-1175. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.04.006

APA

Conyon, M., & He, L. (2011). Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in China. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17(4), 1158-1175. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.04.006

Vancouver

Conyon M, He L. Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in China. Journal of Corporate Finance. 2011;17(4):1158-1175. doi: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.04.006

Author

Conyon, Martin ; He, Lerong. / Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in China. In: Journal of Corporate Finance. 2011 ; Vol. 17, No. 4. pp. 1158-1175.

Bibtex

@article{10d973a754a94cf3885adb289f8089d1,
title = "Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in China",
abstract = "We investigate executivecompensation and corporategovernance in China's publicly traded firms. We also compare executive pay in China to the USA. Consistent with agency theory, we find that executivecompensation is positively correlated to firm performance. The study shows that executive pay and CEO incentives are lower in State controlled firms and firms with concentrated ownership structures. Boardroom governance is important. We find that firms with more independent directors on the board have a higher pay-for-performance link. Non-State (private) controlled firms and firms with more independent directors on the board are more likely to replace the CEO for poor performance. Finally, we document that US executive pay (salary and bonus) is about seventeen times higher than in China. Significant differences in US–China pay persist even after controlling for economic and governance factors.",
keywords = "China, Executive compensation , Equity incentives",
author = "Martin Conyon and Lerong He",
year = "2011",
doi = "10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.04.006",
language = "English",
volume = "17",
pages = "1158--1175",
journal = "Journal of Corporate Finance",
issn = "0929-1199",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in China

AU - Conyon, Martin

AU - He, Lerong

PY - 2011

Y1 - 2011

N2 - We investigate executivecompensation and corporategovernance in China's publicly traded firms. We also compare executive pay in China to the USA. Consistent with agency theory, we find that executivecompensation is positively correlated to firm performance. The study shows that executive pay and CEO incentives are lower in State controlled firms and firms with concentrated ownership structures. Boardroom governance is important. We find that firms with more independent directors on the board have a higher pay-for-performance link. Non-State (private) controlled firms and firms with more independent directors on the board are more likely to replace the CEO for poor performance. Finally, we document that US executive pay (salary and bonus) is about seventeen times higher than in China. Significant differences in US–China pay persist even after controlling for economic and governance factors.

AB - We investigate executivecompensation and corporategovernance in China's publicly traded firms. We also compare executive pay in China to the USA. Consistent with agency theory, we find that executivecompensation is positively correlated to firm performance. The study shows that executive pay and CEO incentives are lower in State controlled firms and firms with concentrated ownership structures. Boardroom governance is important. We find that firms with more independent directors on the board have a higher pay-for-performance link. Non-State (private) controlled firms and firms with more independent directors on the board are more likely to replace the CEO for poor performance. Finally, we document that US executive pay (salary and bonus) is about seventeen times higher than in China. Significant differences in US–China pay persist even after controlling for economic and governance factors.

KW - China

KW - Executive compensation

KW - Equity incentives

U2 - 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.04.006

DO - 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.04.006

M3 - Journal article

VL - 17

SP - 1158

EP - 1175

JO - Journal of Corporate Finance

JF - Journal of Corporate Finance

SN - 0929-1199

IS - 4

ER -