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Executive Pay, Tournaments and Corporate Performance in UK Firms

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Executive Pay, Tournaments and Corporate Performance in UK Firms. / Conyon, Martin; Sadler, G.
In: International Journal of Management Reviews, Vol. 3, No. 2, 06.2001, p. 141-168.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Conyon, M & Sadler, G 2001, 'Executive Pay, Tournaments and Corporate Performance in UK Firms', International Journal of Management Reviews, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 141-168. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2370.00060

APA

Conyon, M., & Sadler, G. (2001). Executive Pay, Tournaments and Corporate Performance in UK Firms. International Journal of Management Reviews, 3(2), 141-168. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2370.00060

Vancouver

Conyon M, Sadler G. Executive Pay, Tournaments and Corporate Performance in UK Firms. International Journal of Management Reviews. 2001 Jun;3(2):141-168. doi: 10.1111/1468-2370.00060

Author

Conyon, Martin ; Sadler, G. / Executive Pay, Tournaments and Corporate Performance in UK Firms. In: International Journal of Management Reviews. 2001 ; Vol. 3, No. 2. pp. 141-168.

Bibtex

@article{0f454a6d619c498aaba5e4e06a0a22de,
title = "Executive Pay, Tournaments and Corporate Performance in UK Firms",
abstract = "This paper explores the relationship between executive pay and corporate performance. First, we focus on the pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS), review recent evidence (mainly UK) and outline a methodology for calculating the PPS itself. Secondly, we review the evidence on tournament theory. Tournament models predict that career concerns generate incentives for executives and can explain observed variations in pay outcomes in the boardroom. Thirdly, we provide evidence on the distribution of the PPS for 532 executives within 100 large UK stock market companies for 1997. Unlike prior work, we include non-CEO executives in the analysis. We show that the PPS increases through organizational levels. Also the statistic is not constant across firms. Finally, we consider the relationship between corporate performance and incentives. We show, consistent with prior evidence, that there is a positive relationship between firm performance and the effective ownership of stock-based compensation by management.",
author = "Martin Conyon and G Sadler",
year = "2001",
month = jun,
doi = "10.1111/1468-2370.00060",
language = "English",
volume = "3",
pages = "141--168",
journal = "International Journal of Management Reviews",
issn = "1460-8545",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Executive Pay, Tournaments and Corporate Performance in UK Firms

AU - Conyon, Martin

AU - Sadler, G

PY - 2001/6

Y1 - 2001/6

N2 - This paper explores the relationship between executive pay and corporate performance. First, we focus on the pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS), review recent evidence (mainly UK) and outline a methodology for calculating the PPS itself. Secondly, we review the evidence on tournament theory. Tournament models predict that career concerns generate incentives for executives and can explain observed variations in pay outcomes in the boardroom. Thirdly, we provide evidence on the distribution of the PPS for 532 executives within 100 large UK stock market companies for 1997. Unlike prior work, we include non-CEO executives in the analysis. We show that the PPS increases through organizational levels. Also the statistic is not constant across firms. Finally, we consider the relationship between corporate performance and incentives. We show, consistent with prior evidence, that there is a positive relationship between firm performance and the effective ownership of stock-based compensation by management.

AB - This paper explores the relationship between executive pay and corporate performance. First, we focus on the pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS), review recent evidence (mainly UK) and outline a methodology for calculating the PPS itself. Secondly, we review the evidence on tournament theory. Tournament models predict that career concerns generate incentives for executives and can explain observed variations in pay outcomes in the boardroom. Thirdly, we provide evidence on the distribution of the PPS for 532 executives within 100 large UK stock market companies for 1997. Unlike prior work, we include non-CEO executives in the analysis. We show that the PPS increases through organizational levels. Also the statistic is not constant across firms. Finally, we consider the relationship between corporate performance and incentives. We show, consistent with prior evidence, that there is a positive relationship between firm performance and the effective ownership of stock-based compensation by management.

U2 - 10.1111/1468-2370.00060

DO - 10.1111/1468-2370.00060

M3 - Journal article

VL - 3

SP - 141

EP - 168

JO - International Journal of Management Reviews

JF - International Journal of Management Reviews

SN - 1460-8545

IS - 2

ER -