Rights statement: This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Haigh, M. and Dodd, A. L. (2017), Extreme cognitions are associated with diminished ability to use disconfirming evidence. Psychol Psychother Theory Res Pract, 90: 70–83. doi:10.1111/papt.12096 which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/papt.12096/abstract This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.
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Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Extreme cognitions are associated with diminished ability to use disconfirming evidence
AU - Haigh, Matthew
AU - Dodd, Alyson Lamont
N1 - This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Haigh, M. and Dodd, A. L. (2017), Extreme cognitions are associated with diminished ability to use disconfirming evidence. Psychol Psychother Theory Res Pract, 90: 70–83. doi:10.1111/papt.12096 which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/papt.12096/abstract This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.
PY - 2017/3
Y1 - 2017/3
N2 - Objectives An Integrative Cognitive Model of mood swings and bipolar disorder proposes that cognitive styles characterised by extreme self-referent appraisals of internal states (e.g., ‘If I have a bad night’s sleep it means that I am about to have a breakdown’) interfere with mood regulation. The aim of this study is to determine whether strong endorsement of such appraisals is predicted by a diminished ability to access disconfirming counterexamples. Design We examined whether the ability to access two different categories of counterexample (known as Disabling Conditions and Alternative Causes) would predict endorsement of extreme appraisals (measured by the Hypomanic Attitudes and Positive Predictions Inventory; HAPPI) and mania risk (measured by the Hypomanic Personality Scale; HPS). Method A non-clinical sample of 150 students completed the HAPPI, the HPS and a conditional reasoning task that indexed the ability to access Disabling Conditions and Alternative Causes. Current mood was controlled for using the Internal States Scale. Results The ability to make use of disabling counterexamples during the reasoning task was inversely related with scores on the HAPPI (r= -.19, p<.05); participants that were less able to make use of disabling counterexamples endorsed extreme self-referent appraisals to a greater extent. There was no association between the use of alternative cause counterexamples and the HAPPI, and no association between either measure of counterexample generation and the HPS. Conclusions A diminished ability to use disconfirming evidence when reasoning about the world may reinforce problematic cognitive styles such as extreme, personalised appraisals of experience, which can interfere with mood regulation.
AB - Objectives An Integrative Cognitive Model of mood swings and bipolar disorder proposes that cognitive styles characterised by extreme self-referent appraisals of internal states (e.g., ‘If I have a bad night’s sleep it means that I am about to have a breakdown’) interfere with mood regulation. The aim of this study is to determine whether strong endorsement of such appraisals is predicted by a diminished ability to access disconfirming counterexamples. Design We examined whether the ability to access two different categories of counterexample (known as Disabling Conditions and Alternative Causes) would predict endorsement of extreme appraisals (measured by the Hypomanic Attitudes and Positive Predictions Inventory; HAPPI) and mania risk (measured by the Hypomanic Personality Scale; HPS). Method A non-clinical sample of 150 students completed the HAPPI, the HPS and a conditional reasoning task that indexed the ability to access Disabling Conditions and Alternative Causes. Current mood was controlled for using the Internal States Scale. Results The ability to make use of disabling counterexamples during the reasoning task was inversely related with scores on the HAPPI (r= -.19, p<.05); participants that were less able to make use of disabling counterexamples endorsed extreme self-referent appraisals to a greater extent. There was no association between the use of alternative cause counterexamples and the HAPPI, and no association between either measure of counterexample generation and the HPS. Conclusions A diminished ability to use disconfirming evidence when reasoning about the world may reinforce problematic cognitive styles such as extreme, personalised appraisals of experience, which can interfere with mood regulation.
KW - Reasoning bias
KW - Hypomanic Personality
KW - Appraisals
KW - Bipolar Disorder
KW - Counterexamples
KW - Beliefs
KW - Conditionals
U2 - 10.1111/papt.12096
DO - 10.1111/papt.12096
M3 - Journal article
VL - 90
SP - 70
EP - 83
JO - Psychology and Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice
JF - Psychology and Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice
SN - 1476-0835
IS - 1
ER -