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First-person authority: an epistemic-pragmatic account

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First-person authority: an epistemic-pragmatic account. / Manson, Neil.
In: Mind and Language, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2012, p. 181-199.

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Manson N. First-person authority: an epistemic-pragmatic account. Mind and Language. 2012;27(2):181-199. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2012.01440.x

Author

Manson, Neil. / First-person authority : an epistemic-pragmatic account. In: Mind and Language. 2012 ; Vol. 27, No. 2. pp. 181-199.

Bibtex

@article{15e004b9d4e54e72bb7d4ca537eb4316,
title = "First-person authority: an epistemic-pragmatic account",
abstract = "Some self-ascriptions of belief, desire and other attitudes exhibit first-person authority. The aim here is to offer a novel account of this kind of first-person authority. The account is a development of Robert Gordon{\textquoteright}s ascent routine theory but is framed in terms of our ability to bring it about that others know of our attitudes via speech acts which do not deploy attitudinal vocabulary but which nonetheless {\textquoteleft}show{\textquoteright} our attitudes to others. Unlike Gordon{\textquoteright}s ascent routine theory, the theory readily applies to attitudes other than belief, avoids a need to appeal to processes of making up one{\textquoteright}s mind, and does not rest upon a distinction between {\textquoteleft}outward looking{\textquoteright} and {\textquoteleft}inward looking{\textquoteright} processes. ",
keywords = "first-person authority, consciousness, self-knowledge, speech acts, epistemology",
author = "Neil Manson",
year = "2012",
doi = "10.1111/j.1468-0017.2012.01440.x",
language = "English",
volume = "27",
pages = "181--199",
journal = "Mind and Language",
issn = "1468-0017",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - First-person authority

T2 - an epistemic-pragmatic account

AU - Manson, Neil

PY - 2012

Y1 - 2012

N2 - Some self-ascriptions of belief, desire and other attitudes exhibit first-person authority. The aim here is to offer a novel account of this kind of first-person authority. The account is a development of Robert Gordon’s ascent routine theory but is framed in terms of our ability to bring it about that others know of our attitudes via speech acts which do not deploy attitudinal vocabulary but which nonetheless ‘show’ our attitudes to others. Unlike Gordon’s ascent routine theory, the theory readily applies to attitudes other than belief, avoids a need to appeal to processes of making up one’s mind, and does not rest upon a distinction between ‘outward looking’ and ‘inward looking’ processes.

AB - Some self-ascriptions of belief, desire and other attitudes exhibit first-person authority. The aim here is to offer a novel account of this kind of first-person authority. The account is a development of Robert Gordon’s ascent routine theory but is framed in terms of our ability to bring it about that others know of our attitudes via speech acts which do not deploy attitudinal vocabulary but which nonetheless ‘show’ our attitudes to others. Unlike Gordon’s ascent routine theory, the theory readily applies to attitudes other than belief, avoids a need to appeal to processes of making up one’s mind, and does not rest upon a distinction between ‘outward looking’ and ‘inward looking’ processes.

KW - first-person authority

KW - consciousness

KW - self-knowledge

KW - speech acts

KW - epistemology

U2 - 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2012.01440.x

DO - 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2012.01440.x

M3 - Journal article

VL - 27

SP - 181

EP - 199

JO - Mind and Language

JF - Mind and Language

SN - 1468-0017

IS - 2

ER -