Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - First-person authority
T2 - an epistemic-pragmatic account
AU - Manson, Neil
PY - 2012
Y1 - 2012
N2 - Some self-ascriptions of belief, desire and other attitudes exhibit first-person authority. The aim here is to offer a novel account of this kind of first-person authority. The account is a development of Robert Gordon’s ascent routine theory but is framed in terms of our ability to bring it about that others know of our attitudes via speech acts which do not deploy attitudinal vocabulary but which nonetheless ‘show’ our attitudes to others. Unlike Gordon’s ascent routine theory, the theory readily applies to attitudes other than belief, avoids a need to appeal to processes of making up one’s mind, and does not rest upon a distinction between ‘outward looking’ and ‘inward looking’ processes.
AB - Some self-ascriptions of belief, desire and other attitudes exhibit first-person authority. The aim here is to offer a novel account of this kind of first-person authority. The account is a development of Robert Gordon’s ascent routine theory but is framed in terms of our ability to bring it about that others know of our attitudes via speech acts which do not deploy attitudinal vocabulary but which nonetheless ‘show’ our attitudes to others. Unlike Gordon’s ascent routine theory, the theory readily applies to attitudes other than belief, avoids a need to appeal to processes of making up one’s mind, and does not rest upon a distinction between ‘outward looking’ and ‘inward looking’ processes.
KW - first-person authority
KW - consciousness
KW - self-knowledge
KW - speech acts
KW - epistemology
U2 - 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2012.01440.x
DO - 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2012.01440.x
M3 - Journal article
VL - 27
SP - 181
EP - 199
JO - Mind and Language
JF - Mind and Language
SN - 1468-0017
IS - 2
ER -