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Fishing rights, property rights, human rights: the problem of legal lock-in in UK fisheries

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Fishing rights, property rights, human rights: the problem of legal lock-in in UK fisheries. / Appleby, Thomas; Cardwell, Emma Jayne; Pettipher, Jim.
In: Elementa: Science of the Anthropocene, Vol. 6, 40, 18.05.2018.

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Appleby T, Cardwell EJ, Pettipher J. Fishing rights, property rights, human rights: the problem of legal lock-in in UK fisheries. Elementa: Science of the Anthropocene. 2018 May 18;6:40. doi: 10.1525/elementa.295

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Appleby, Thomas ; Cardwell, Emma Jayne ; Pettipher, Jim. / Fishing rights, property rights, human rights : the problem of legal lock-in in UK fisheries. In: Elementa: Science of the Anthropocene. 2018 ; Vol. 6.

Bibtex

@article{2a2c6a3926354e60b58fe8a494d0c3bd,
title = "Fishing rights, property rights, human rights: the problem of legal lock-in in UK fisheries",
abstract = "Property rights are a widely advocated policy tool to encourage stewardship over a range of environmental goods. Despite the extent to which property rights are dependent upon law to work, economists rarely consider that property rights are enmeshed within a complex web of pre-existing national and international legal frameworks—such as human rights law—that put strict limitations on the way they operate. This important issue is illustrated here with reference to the legal struggles in the UK around the “ownership” of fishing rights. The social and economic changes under market-based management in the UK made the fisheries regulatory regime unpopular, and undoubtedly contributed to the overwhelming vote within the catch sector to leave the European Union, even though the responsibility to allocate fishing opportunities to the British fishing industry lay with the UK authorities. The lesson from the UK experience is that despite the legal-blindness of much resource economics, the application of economic theory should not outrun its legal foundations. We conclude that promoting the allocation of public fishing rights to the private sector without adequate safeguards—such as a valuation of the rights in question and carefully considered written terms and conditions—could be considered negligent.",
keywords = "Fisheries, fisheries management, market based environmental policy, property rights, property law, ITQ",
author = "Thomas Appleby and Cardwell, {Emma Jayne} and Jim Pettipher",
year = "2018",
month = may,
day = "18",
doi = "10.1525/elementa.295",
language = "English",
volume = "6",
journal = "Elementa: Science of the Anthropocene",
issn = "2325-1026",
publisher = "BioOne",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Fishing rights, property rights, human rights

T2 - the problem of legal lock-in in UK fisheries

AU - Appleby, Thomas

AU - Cardwell, Emma Jayne

AU - Pettipher, Jim

PY - 2018/5/18

Y1 - 2018/5/18

N2 - Property rights are a widely advocated policy tool to encourage stewardship over a range of environmental goods. Despite the extent to which property rights are dependent upon law to work, economists rarely consider that property rights are enmeshed within a complex web of pre-existing national and international legal frameworks—such as human rights law—that put strict limitations on the way they operate. This important issue is illustrated here with reference to the legal struggles in the UK around the “ownership” of fishing rights. The social and economic changes under market-based management in the UK made the fisheries regulatory regime unpopular, and undoubtedly contributed to the overwhelming vote within the catch sector to leave the European Union, even though the responsibility to allocate fishing opportunities to the British fishing industry lay with the UK authorities. The lesson from the UK experience is that despite the legal-blindness of much resource economics, the application of economic theory should not outrun its legal foundations. We conclude that promoting the allocation of public fishing rights to the private sector without adequate safeguards—such as a valuation of the rights in question and carefully considered written terms and conditions—could be considered negligent.

AB - Property rights are a widely advocated policy tool to encourage stewardship over a range of environmental goods. Despite the extent to which property rights are dependent upon law to work, economists rarely consider that property rights are enmeshed within a complex web of pre-existing national and international legal frameworks—such as human rights law—that put strict limitations on the way they operate. This important issue is illustrated here with reference to the legal struggles in the UK around the “ownership” of fishing rights. The social and economic changes under market-based management in the UK made the fisheries regulatory regime unpopular, and undoubtedly contributed to the overwhelming vote within the catch sector to leave the European Union, even though the responsibility to allocate fishing opportunities to the British fishing industry lay with the UK authorities. The lesson from the UK experience is that despite the legal-blindness of much resource economics, the application of economic theory should not outrun its legal foundations. We conclude that promoting the allocation of public fishing rights to the private sector without adequate safeguards—such as a valuation of the rights in question and carefully considered written terms and conditions—could be considered negligent.

KW - Fisheries

KW - fisheries management

KW - market based environmental policy

KW - property rights

KW - property law

KW - ITQ

U2 - 10.1525/elementa.295

DO - 10.1525/elementa.295

M3 - Journal article

VL - 6

JO - Elementa: Science of the Anthropocene

JF - Elementa: Science of the Anthropocene

SN - 2325-1026

M1 - 40

ER -