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  • FlowAuctions

    Rights statement: The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-016-0549-3

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Flow auctions

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

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Flow auctions. / Kremer, Ilan; Wiener, Zvi; Winter, Eyal.
In: International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 46, No. 3, 08.2017, p. 655-665.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review

Harvard

Kremer, I, Wiener, Z & Winter, E 2017, 'Flow auctions', International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 46, no. 3, pp. 655-665. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-016-0549-3

APA

Kremer, I., Wiener, Z., & Winter, E. (2017). Flow auctions. International Journal of Game Theory, 46(3), 655-665. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-016-0549-3

Vancouver

Kremer I, Wiener Z, Winter E. Flow auctions. International Journal of Game Theory. 2017 Aug;46(3):655-665. Epub 2016 Aug 29. doi: 10.1007/s00182-016-0549-3

Author

Kremer, Ilan ; Wiener, Zvi ; Winter, Eyal. / Flow auctions. In: International Journal of Game Theory. 2017 ; Vol. 46, No. 3. pp. 655-665.

Bibtex

@article{ec9fd436a8e544ae9ff4ed1f2e0ec912,
title = "Flow auctions",
abstract = "Flow goods (like electricity) are sold through auctions in a dynamic framework. An important design question is the frequency of such auctions. We use a simple dynamic auction model in continuous time to answer this question. We focus on the relationship between the persistency of bidders{\textquoteright} valuations and the optimal choice of frequency. If the seller focuses on the equilibrium in which bidders follow a repeated static Nash strategy, then the frequency of auctions should typically increase when persistency declines. However, accounting for the fact that bidders can follow different equilibria that are collusive in nature, the comparative statics are reversed, forcing the seller to reduce the frequency when bidders{\textquoteright} valuations are less persistent. The argument builds on the fact that high frequency auctions are more conducive to collusion among bidders. {\textcopyright} 2016, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.",
keywords = "Auctions, Collusion, Contracting, Dynamics, Nash equilibrium",
author = "Ilan Kremer and Zvi Wiener and Eyal Winter",
note = "The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-016-0549-3",
year = "2017",
month = aug,
doi = "10.1007/s00182-016-0549-3",
language = "English",
volume = "46",
pages = "655--665",
journal = "International Journal of Game Theory",
issn = "0020-7276",
publisher = "Springer-Verlag,",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Flow auctions

AU - Kremer, Ilan

AU - Wiener, Zvi

AU - Winter, Eyal

N1 - The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-016-0549-3

PY - 2017/8

Y1 - 2017/8

N2 - Flow goods (like electricity) are sold through auctions in a dynamic framework. An important design question is the frequency of such auctions. We use a simple dynamic auction model in continuous time to answer this question. We focus on the relationship between the persistency of bidders’ valuations and the optimal choice of frequency. If the seller focuses on the equilibrium in which bidders follow a repeated static Nash strategy, then the frequency of auctions should typically increase when persistency declines. However, accounting for the fact that bidders can follow different equilibria that are collusive in nature, the comparative statics are reversed, forcing the seller to reduce the frequency when bidders’ valuations are less persistent. The argument builds on the fact that high frequency auctions are more conducive to collusion among bidders. © 2016, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.

AB - Flow goods (like electricity) are sold through auctions in a dynamic framework. An important design question is the frequency of such auctions. We use a simple dynamic auction model in continuous time to answer this question. We focus on the relationship between the persistency of bidders’ valuations and the optimal choice of frequency. If the seller focuses on the equilibrium in which bidders follow a repeated static Nash strategy, then the frequency of auctions should typically increase when persistency declines. However, accounting for the fact that bidders can follow different equilibria that are collusive in nature, the comparative statics are reversed, forcing the seller to reduce the frequency when bidders’ valuations are less persistent. The argument builds on the fact that high frequency auctions are more conducive to collusion among bidders. © 2016, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.

KW - Auctions

KW - Collusion

KW - Contracting

KW - Dynamics

KW - Nash equilibrium

U2 - 10.1007/s00182-016-0549-3

DO - 10.1007/s00182-016-0549-3

M3 - Journal article

VL - 46

SP - 655

EP - 665

JO - International Journal of Game Theory

JF - International Journal of Game Theory

SN - 0020-7276

IS - 3

ER -