Rights statement: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/hegel-bulletin The final, definitive version of this article has been published in the Journal, Hegel Bulletin, FirstView, 2017, © 2017 Cambridge University Press.
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Final published version
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
Research output: Contribution to Journal/Magazine › Journal article › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Hegel and Colonialism
AU - Stone, Alison Laura
N1 - https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/hegel-bulletin The final, definitive version of this article has been published in the Journal, Hegel Bulletin, FirstView, 2017, © 2017 Cambridge University Press.
PY - 2017/6/27
Y1 - 2017/6/27
N2 - This article explores the implications of Hegel’s Philosophy of World History with respect to colonialism. For Hegel, freedom can be recognized and practised only in classical, Christian and modern Europe; therefore, the world’s other peoples can acquire freedom only if Europeans impose their civilization upon them. Although this imposition denies freedom to colonized peoples, this denial is legitimate for Hegel because it is the sole condition on which these peoples can gain freedom in the longer term. The article then considers whether Hegel’s basic account of freedom can be extricated from his Eurocentric and pro-colonialist interpretation of the course of history. The article argues that matters are more complicated because that interpretation has significant connections with Hegel’s conception of freedom as self-determination.
AB - This article explores the implications of Hegel’s Philosophy of World History with respect to colonialism. For Hegel, freedom can be recognized and practised only in classical, Christian and modern Europe; therefore, the world’s other peoples can acquire freedom only if Europeans impose their civilization upon them. Although this imposition denies freedom to colonized peoples, this denial is legitimate for Hegel because it is the sole condition on which these peoples can gain freedom in the longer term. The article then considers whether Hegel’s basic account of freedom can be extricated from his Eurocentric and pro-colonialist interpretation of the course of history. The article argues that matters are more complicated because that interpretation has significant connections with Hegel’s conception of freedom as self-determination.
U2 - 10.1017/hgl.2017.17
DO - 10.1017/hgl.2017.17
M3 - Journal article
JO - Hegel Bulletin
JF - Hegel Bulletin
SN - 2051-5367
ER -