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Helpless in finance: the cost of helping effort among bank employees

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Published
<mark>Journal publication date</mark>06/2009
<mark>Journal</mark>Journal of Labor Research
Issue number2
Volume30
Number of pages20
Pages (from-to)176-195
Publication StatusPublished
<mark>Original language</mark>English

Abstract

Theory suggests that individual performance pay increases effort but may reduce the incentive to help co-workers. In an original survey of finance industry employees subject to individual performance pay, we demonstrate that those workers who report they do not help co-workers earn significantly more. This result is particularly strong for those workers with the strongest individual performance pay incentives. Moreover, when those workers report that their coworkers help them, they also earn significantly more. These dual results are consistent with a strong incentive to free-ride on the helping effort of others in the face of individual performance pay.