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    Rights statement: This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Cooper, R. (2015), How Might I Have Been?. Metaphilosophy, 46: 495–514. doi: 10.1111/meta.12152 which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/meta.12152/abstract This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.

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How might I have been?

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal article

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How might I have been? / Cooper, Rachel.

In: Metaphilosophy, Vol. 46, No. 4-5, 10.2015, p. 495-514.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal article

Harvard

Cooper, R 2015, 'How might I have been?' Metaphilosophy, vol. 46, no. 4-5, pp. 495-514. https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12152

APA

Cooper, R. (2015). How might I have been? Metaphilosophy, 46(4-5), 495-514. https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12152

Vancouver

Cooper R. How might I have been? Metaphilosophy. 2015 Oct;46(4-5):495-514. https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12152

Author

Cooper, Rachel. / How might I have been?. In: Metaphilosophy. 2015 ; Vol. 46, No. 4-5. pp. 495-514.

Bibtex

@article{0d7c7e08ec68415295dd3f13853bc6bc,
title = "How might I have been?",
abstract = "What would my life have been like if I had been born more intelligent? Or taller? Or a member of the opposite sex? Or a non-biological being? It is plausible that some of these questions make sense, while others stretch the limits of sense making. In addressing questions of how I might have been, genetic essentialism is popular, but this article argues that genetic essentialism, and other versions of origin essentialism for organisms, must be rejected. It considers the prospects for counterpart theory and shows how counterpart theory can be used to illuminate volitional accounts of identity as proposed by Harry Frankfurt. This enables one to make sense of claims that, say, being gay, or Deaf, or black, can be essential to someone's identity. The discussion is then extended to show how it can be made applicable to the transworld identity theorist who denies that individuals possess essential properties.",
keywords = "transworld identity, counterparts, Lewis, Frankfurt, Mackie",
author = "Rachel Cooper",
note = "This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Cooper, R. (2015), How Might I Have Been?. Metaphilosophy, 46: 495–514. doi: 10.1111/meta.12152 which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/meta.12152/abstract This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.",
year = "2015",
month = "10",
doi = "10.1111/meta.12152",
language = "English",
volume = "46",
pages = "495--514",
journal = "Metaphilosophy",
issn = "0026-1068",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "4-5",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - How might I have been?

AU - Cooper, Rachel

N1 - This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Cooper, R. (2015), How Might I Have Been?. Metaphilosophy, 46: 495–514. doi: 10.1111/meta.12152 which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/meta.12152/abstract This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.

PY - 2015/10

Y1 - 2015/10

N2 - What would my life have been like if I had been born more intelligent? Or taller? Or a member of the opposite sex? Or a non-biological being? It is plausible that some of these questions make sense, while others stretch the limits of sense making. In addressing questions of how I might have been, genetic essentialism is popular, but this article argues that genetic essentialism, and other versions of origin essentialism for organisms, must be rejected. It considers the prospects for counterpart theory and shows how counterpart theory can be used to illuminate volitional accounts of identity as proposed by Harry Frankfurt. This enables one to make sense of claims that, say, being gay, or Deaf, or black, can be essential to someone's identity. The discussion is then extended to show how it can be made applicable to the transworld identity theorist who denies that individuals possess essential properties.

AB - What would my life have been like if I had been born more intelligent? Or taller? Or a member of the opposite sex? Or a non-biological being? It is plausible that some of these questions make sense, while others stretch the limits of sense making. In addressing questions of how I might have been, genetic essentialism is popular, but this article argues that genetic essentialism, and other versions of origin essentialism for organisms, must be rejected. It considers the prospects for counterpart theory and shows how counterpart theory can be used to illuminate volitional accounts of identity as proposed by Harry Frankfurt. This enables one to make sense of claims that, say, being gay, or Deaf, or black, can be essential to someone's identity. The discussion is then extended to show how it can be made applicable to the transworld identity theorist who denies that individuals possess essential properties.

KW - transworld identity

KW - counterparts

KW - Lewis

KW - Frankfurt

KW - Mackie

U2 - 10.1111/meta.12152

DO - 10.1111/meta.12152

M3 - Journal article

VL - 46

SP - 495

EP - 514

JO - Metaphilosophy

JF - Metaphilosophy

SN - 0026-1068

IS - 4-5

ER -