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Improving Abatement Levels and Welfare by Coarse Correlation in an Environmental Game

Research output: Working paper

Published
Publication date05/2019
Place of PublicationLancaster
PublisherLancaster University, Department of Economics
Original languageEnglish

Publication series

NameEconomics Working Papers Series

Abstract

Coarse correlated equilibria (CCE, Moulin and Vial, 1978) can be used to substantially improve upon the Nash equilibrium solution of the well-analysed abatement game (Barrett, 1994). We show this by computing successively the CCE with the largest total utility, the one with the highest possible abatement levels and finally, the one with maximal abatement level while maintaining at
least the level of utility from the Nash outcome.