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Improving Abatement Levels and Welfare by Coarse Correlation in an Environmental Game

Research output: Working paper

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Improving Abatement Levels and Welfare by Coarse Correlation in an Environmental Game. / Dokka Venkata Satyanaraya, Trivikram; Moulin, Herve; Ray, Indrajit; Sen Gupta, Sonali.

Lancaster : Lancaster University, Department of Economics, 2019. (Economics Working Papers Series).

Research output: Working paper

Harvard

Dokka Venkata Satyanaraya, T, Moulin, H, Ray, I & Sen Gupta, S 2019 'Improving Abatement Levels and Welfare by Coarse Correlation in an Environmental Game' Economics Working Papers Series, Lancaster University, Department of Economics, Lancaster.

APA

Dokka Venkata Satyanaraya, T., Moulin, H., Ray, I., & Sen Gupta, S. (2019). Improving Abatement Levels and Welfare by Coarse Correlation in an Environmental Game. (Economics Working Papers Series). Lancaster: Lancaster University, Department of Economics.

Vancouver

Dokka Venkata Satyanaraya T, Moulin H, Ray I, Sen Gupta S. Improving Abatement Levels and Welfare by Coarse Correlation in an Environmental Game. Lancaster: Lancaster University, Department of Economics. 2019 May. (Economics Working Papers Series).

Author

Dokka Venkata Satyanaraya, Trivikram ; Moulin, Herve ; Ray, Indrajit ; Sen Gupta, Sonali. / Improving Abatement Levels and Welfare by Coarse Correlation in an Environmental Game. Lancaster : Lancaster University, Department of Economics, 2019. (Economics Working Papers Series).

Bibtex

@techreport{2220260a8bc94cd48d028452787422d7,
title = "Improving Abatement Levels and Welfare by Coarse Correlation in an Environmental Game",
abstract = "Coarse correlated equilibria (CCE, Moulin and Vial, 1978) can be used to substantially improve upon the Nash equilibrium solution of the well-analysed abatement game (Barrett, 1994). We show this by computing successively the CCE with the largest total utility, the one with the highest possible abatement levels and finally, the one with maximal abatement level while maintaining atleast the level of utility from the Nash outcome.",
keywords = "Abatement game, Coarse correlated equilibrium, Efficiency gain",
author = "{Dokka Venkata Satyanaraya}, Trivikram and Herve Moulin and Indrajit Ray and {Sen Gupta}, Sonali",
year = "2019",
month = "5",
language = "English",
series = "Economics Working Papers Series",
publisher = "Lancaster University, Department of Economics",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Lancaster University, Department of Economics",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Improving Abatement Levels and Welfare by Coarse Correlation in an Environmental Game

AU - Dokka Venkata Satyanaraya, Trivikram

AU - Moulin, Herve

AU - Ray, Indrajit

AU - Sen Gupta, Sonali

PY - 2019/5

Y1 - 2019/5

N2 - Coarse correlated equilibria (CCE, Moulin and Vial, 1978) can be used to substantially improve upon the Nash equilibrium solution of the well-analysed abatement game (Barrett, 1994). We show this by computing successively the CCE with the largest total utility, the one with the highest possible abatement levels and finally, the one with maximal abatement level while maintaining atleast the level of utility from the Nash outcome.

AB - Coarse correlated equilibria (CCE, Moulin and Vial, 1978) can be used to substantially improve upon the Nash equilibrium solution of the well-analysed abatement game (Barrett, 1994). We show this by computing successively the CCE with the largest total utility, the one with the highest possible abatement levels and finally, the one with maximal abatement level while maintaining atleast the level of utility from the Nash outcome.

KW - Abatement game

KW - Coarse correlated equilibrium

KW - Efficiency gain

M3 - Working paper

T3 - Economics Working Papers Series

BT - Improving Abatement Levels and Welfare by Coarse Correlation in an Environmental Game

PB - Lancaster University, Department of Economics

CY - Lancaster

ER -