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In defence of fear: COVID-19, crises and democracy

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In defence of fear: COVID-19, crises and democracy. / Degerman, Dan; Flinders, Matthew; Johnson, Matthew.
In: Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, Vol. 26, No. 6, 31.08.2023, p. 788-809.

Research output: Contribution to Journal/MagazineJournal articlepeer-review

Harvard

Degerman, D, Flinders, M & Johnson, M 2023, 'In defence of fear: COVID-19, crises and democracy', Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, vol. 26, no. 6, pp. 788-809. https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2020.1834744

APA

Degerman, D., Flinders, M., & Johnson, M. (2023). In defence of fear: COVID-19, crises and democracy. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 26(6), 788-809. https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2020.1834744

Vancouver

Degerman D, Flinders M, Johnson M. In defence of fear: COVID-19, crises and democracy. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy. 2023 Aug 31;26(6):788-809. Epub 2020 Oct 22. doi: 10.1080/13698230.2020.1834744

Author

Degerman, Dan ; Flinders, Matthew ; Johnson, Matthew. / In defence of fear : COVID-19, crises and democracy. In: Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy. 2023 ; Vol. 26, No. 6. pp. 788-809.

Bibtex

@article{5022eddbff85409ba2c621ff5b59e3cf,
title = "In defence of fear: COVID-19, crises and democracy",
abstract = "The COVID-19 crisis has served not just to instil fear in the populace but to highlight the importance of fear as a motivating dynamic in politics. The gradual emergence of political-philosophical approaches calling for concern for {\textquoteleft}positive{\textquoteright} emotions may have made sense under non-pandemic conditions. Now, however, describing fear in the face of a deadly pandemic as {\textquoteleft}irrational{\textquoteright} or born of {\textquoteleft}ignorance{\textquoteright} seems {\textquoteleft}irrational{\textquoteright} and {\textquoteleft}ignorant{\textquoteright}. In this article, we draw upon the work of John Gray and behavioural science to present a defence of fear. We show how the pandemic has highlighted deficits in the work of four thinkers highly critical of fear: Martha Nussbaum, Zygmunt Bauman, Hannah Arendt and Sara Ahmed. We argue that, if such approaches are to be of value in anything other than optimal conditions, then they have to acknowledge the fundamental role of fear in helping human beings to pursue fundamental interests.",
keywords = "Fear, emotions, irrationality, politics, public health",
author = "Dan Degerman and Matthew Flinders and Matthew Johnson",
year = "2023",
month = aug,
day = "31",
doi = "10.1080/13698230.2020.1834744",
language = "English",
volume = "26",
pages = "788--809",
journal = "Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy",
issn = "1369-8230",
publisher = "Routledge",
number = "6",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - In defence of fear

T2 - COVID-19, crises and democracy

AU - Degerman, Dan

AU - Flinders, Matthew

AU - Johnson, Matthew

PY - 2023/8/31

Y1 - 2023/8/31

N2 - The COVID-19 crisis has served not just to instil fear in the populace but to highlight the importance of fear as a motivating dynamic in politics. The gradual emergence of political-philosophical approaches calling for concern for ‘positive’ emotions may have made sense under non-pandemic conditions. Now, however, describing fear in the face of a deadly pandemic as ‘irrational’ or born of ‘ignorance’ seems ‘irrational’ and ‘ignorant’. In this article, we draw upon the work of John Gray and behavioural science to present a defence of fear. We show how the pandemic has highlighted deficits in the work of four thinkers highly critical of fear: Martha Nussbaum, Zygmunt Bauman, Hannah Arendt and Sara Ahmed. We argue that, if such approaches are to be of value in anything other than optimal conditions, then they have to acknowledge the fundamental role of fear in helping human beings to pursue fundamental interests.

AB - The COVID-19 crisis has served not just to instil fear in the populace but to highlight the importance of fear as a motivating dynamic in politics. The gradual emergence of political-philosophical approaches calling for concern for ‘positive’ emotions may have made sense under non-pandemic conditions. Now, however, describing fear in the face of a deadly pandemic as ‘irrational’ or born of ‘ignorance’ seems ‘irrational’ and ‘ignorant’. In this article, we draw upon the work of John Gray and behavioural science to present a defence of fear. We show how the pandemic has highlighted deficits in the work of four thinkers highly critical of fear: Martha Nussbaum, Zygmunt Bauman, Hannah Arendt and Sara Ahmed. We argue that, if such approaches are to be of value in anything other than optimal conditions, then they have to acknowledge the fundamental role of fear in helping human beings to pursue fundamental interests.

KW - Fear

KW - emotions

KW - irrationality

KW - politics

KW - public health

U2 - 10.1080/13698230.2020.1834744

DO - 10.1080/13698230.2020.1834744

M3 - Journal article

VL - 26

SP - 788

EP - 809

JO - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy

JF - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy

SN - 1369-8230

IS - 6

ER -